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PREFACE
When nuclear technology was being implemented in Finland in the 1960s 
and 1970s, the significance of research in creating and developing know-how 
regarding nuclear safety was already clear. Finland’s capacity for decision-making 
– independent of the suppliers of nuclear power plants and safety assessments – 
has been developed systematically in national nuclear safety research programmes 
since the beginning of the 1990s. The research programme now under preparation 
is the fifth to cover the various areas of competence of the safety research of 
nuclear power plants.
The planning of the new nuclear safety research programme considers the changes 
in the operating environment reflecting the changes in the energy system in 
Finland and the global framework. Planning is guided by the research strategy 
for the nuclear power sector, covering the period up to 2030, prepared under 
the supervision of the Ministry of Economy Affairs and Employment (MEAE). 
The national research strategy strongly emphasises the significance of national 
programmes and sets new goals for increasing the scientific level of research and 
its internationalisation. The significance of sufficient resources and of the applicable 
infrastructure is also presented. The strategy emphasises the importance of 
European research for Finland and the need to develop business from the research.
The national nuclear power plant safety research programme SAFIR2018 is the 
largest national research programme and a significant factor in the field. The  
SAFIR2018 research programme has received international recognition both 
in the evaluation of the programme and in connection with the handling of 
the Convention on Nuclear Safety. The renewal of the nuclear safety research 
infrastructure has proceeded well and valuable assets have been developed to 
enable high-level nuclear safety research in Finland. Earlier results of the research 
10
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programme, a solid Framework Plan with interesting research topics and high-
quality results, are important for co-operation with new international partners.
The MEAE started preparing the Framework Plan for the new national nuclear 
power plant safety research programme in November 2017. The programme’s 
planning group has included representatives from all key organisations 
participating in nuclear safety work along with experts in the field so that 17 people 
in total have been involved in preparing this new programme with the support of 
numerous experts in different stakeholder organisations. 
Continuous improvement and systematic building of capability for solving nuclear 
safety issues relevant to Finnish nuclear power plants have been the driving forces 
behind the planning of the new research programme. Research creates expertise 
and vigilance in identifying safety issues. Competence resides primarily in people, 
but also in infrastructure, such as laboratories and computational software, 
educational and training organisations, national and international networks of 
cooperation and government and industry more broadly. In the planning work, 
the working group has accepted the challenge and, as a result, programme level 
goals for 2022 and even for 2026 have been set for eight overarching topical areas. 
Shared topics of interest with the national nuclear waste management research 
programme KYT2022 have been identified and enhanced co-operation between 
the programmes is expected during the next programme period. 
The management of overall safety and strong emphasis on the principles of 
defence in depth, not only in design but also at the national institutional level, call 
for multidisciplinary projects. As new topics, the safety and security interfaces and 
insight of the changes in the energy systems and operating environment open up 
new challenging research issues. Further enhancement of the programme and an 
even more ambitious goal for the research programme are well justified due to 
ongoing major investments. 
The planning group has been engaged to further enhance national nuclear safety 
research in Finland and brought new insight to the programme. Enthusiastic and 
multidisciplinary discussions on nuclear safety research took place during the work. 
The preparation process has produced a solid and interesting research entity, which 
is one tangible step towards the implementation of the research strategy for the 
11
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nuclear power sector. The preparation work of the Framework Plan has created a 
solid foundation for the new SAFIR2022 research programme and beyond.
Marja-Leena Järvinen 
Chairman of the working group
12
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1 Introduction
The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE) is initiating a four-year 
national technical and scientific research programme on the safety of nuclear 
power plants for the years 2019 and 2022. The new programme is a continuation 
in the series of government-led nuclear safety programmes that have proven their 
value in maintaining and developing expertise. The safety research programme 
is based on Chapter 7a (“Ensuring availability of expertise”) of the Finnish Nuclear 
Energy Act. In essence, the programme covers the themes of the SAFIR2018 
programme that will end in 2018 [1, 2]. The programme is funded by the Finnish 
State Nuclear Waste Management Fund (VYR), as well as other key organisations 
operating in the area of nuclear energy. The annual funding of the SAFIR2018 
programme has been approximately EUR 10 million per year. During the new 
programme period, development of national nuclear safety research infrastructures 
still requires a major share in the VYR funding. The new programme also aims at 
funding used for research to remain constant or to increase slightly from SAFIR2018. 
The abbreviation SAFIR2022 is used for the new research programme.
In parallel to the SAFIR2022 programme, the MEAE is continuing the annual VYR 
funding for VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety (infrastructure investments until 2020 and 
laboratory rents). The MEAE proposes funding for the VYR in connection with the 
rest of the project entity in conformance with Chapter 7a of the Nuclear Energy Act.
The planning period for the national research programme on nuclear power plant 
safety up to 2022 involves several licencing phases for new and existing power 
plants: the periodic safety review for Loviisa 1 and 2 is due in 2023, operation of 
Olkiluoto 3 is about to start, and the construction licence application for Hanhikivi 
1 is under evaluation. An operating licence application for building a final disposal 
facility for spent nuclear fuel will be prepared. These processes are reflected in many 
ways in national safety research. The renewal of the operating license for Olkiluoto 
14
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1 and 2 to extend the lifetime to 60 years is under government review at the time 
of writing this Framework Plan. Expertise developed in publicly funded research 
programmes is applied to the licensing processes.
As new plant projects advance, more expert resources are needed. New projects 
have increased international interest in nuclear safety work and research carried 
out in this area in Finland. The construction of the new unit and other new projects 
have also increased the attractiveness of the field, which is reflected in students’ 
interest in the field, as well as in the number of applications for vacant positions.
Research in nuclear safety requires comprehensive training and commitment. The 
research programme serves as an important environment providing long-term 
activity, which is especially important now that the research community is facing 
a generation change. A new generation of researchers has to be recruited and 
engaged. The international evaluation of the current research programme [3] stated 
that the research by VTT, Lappeenranta University of Technology (LUT) and other 
involved research organisations is meeting very high standards. Maintaining this 
kind of activity across different organisations in today’s world is a challenge.
The licensing processes and the possibility of recruiting new personnel for safety-
related research projects provide an opportunity for experts of different ages to 
work together, facilitating the transfer of knowledge between generations. This 
ensures that the available experience of running nuclear power plants is exploited 
in the best possible manner.
Globalisation and networking highlight the importance of national safety research. 
This creates pressure to unify nuclear safety requirements and supervision 
procedures. Currently, there are many projects related to national regulations 
and international safety requirements and guidelines. The directive amending 
the Nuclear Safety Directive was published in 2014 and it is now implemented in 
national law. A country such as Finland also has to be very active in international 
nuclear safety programmes, such as the IAEA, OECD NEA, Euratom Programmes, the 
JHR community and the NKS research.
The MEAE and the Finnish State Nuclear Waste Management Fund (VYR) appointed 
the administrative organisation and director to the new research programme 
15
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on the basis of a public tendering process in March 2018, and in 2017 appointed 
the members to the working group from representatives of central organisations 
taking part in nuclear safety work [6]. The objective of the working group was to 
produce the Framework Plan for the research programme, as well as a proposal for 
its organisation.
The working group has supplemented its expertise by consulting experts, and 
approximately 70 professionals from different organisations have taken part 
in the planning. During the process, the working group was subdivided into 
three separate teams that will also form the fields of research of the SAFIR2022 
programme. As part of the planning process, a SAFIR2022 workshop was held in 
April 2018 in Otaniemi, with 70 attending delegates. The group assignments for 
the seminar, which the teams have since developed further, have made a great 
contribution to creating the Framework Plan.
The international evaluation of the SAFIR2018 programme ordered by the MEAE, 
whose final report was published in May 2018 [3], has also provided valuable input 
into the planning process. The evaluation panel’s recommendations for the next 
programme were:
  1. Develop a strategic roadmap 
  2. Consider flexible funding to support diverse projects and more new  
   initiatives 
  3. Consider flexible organising to build a vibrant research community 
  4. Develop ways to assess impact 
  5. Think of organisational change as a collaborative opportunity.
The evaluation panel’s recommendations were taken into account in the SAFIR2022 
Framework Plan. They will also be applied to future project proposals and the 
forthcoming operational management handbook revision.
The Finnish National Research Programme on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants 
SAFIR2022 will begin with a public call for research proposals in August 2018. The 
MEAE will appoint the Management Board for the new research programme in 
summer 2018. The programme will start at the beginning of 2019.
16
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This document presents a proposal for the organisation of the programme, 
describes the operating environment, and elaborates on the research areas of 
SAFIR2022 and on their needs for research. The research areas and needs are based 
on the knowledge available at the time the Framework Plan is drafted. The research 
programme takes into account possible changes in the operating environment 
and, if new challenges manifest themselves, new research topics supporting the 
objectives of the programme can be included. 
17
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2 Organisation of the Research 
Programme
2.1 Purpose of the programme and societal impact goals
In accordance with Chapter 7a of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, which was 
enacted in 2004, the objective of the SAFIR2018 research programme is to ensure 
that “should such new factors concerning safe operation of nuclear facilities emerge 
that could not be foreseen, the authorities have such sufficient and comprehensive 
nuclear engineering expertise and other facilities at their disposal that can be 
used, when necessary, to analyse without delay the significance of such factors”. 
High scientific quality for the research projects is required in the programme. Their 
results must be available for publication.
Bearing in mind the continuous improvement, the programme covers the themes 
of the SAFIR2018 programme that will end in 2018: 1) Plant safety and systemic 
approach to safety, 2) Reactor safety and 3) Structural safety and materials. In 
more detail, safety assessment capability is developed and created in human and 
organisation factors, nuclear safety I&C and electrical systems, fuel safety, thermal 
hydraulic methods, severe accidents assessment, primary coolant circuit, structures 
and research on probabilistic methods. The Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant 
accident caused by the 2011 earthquake and the subsequent tsunami in Japan 
resulted in an increase in the volume of research in such areas as extreme external 
hazards and accident management. While previously mentioned research topics 
are well covered in the programme, there is room for improvement in the research 
of the interfaces for safety and security. This emerging topic needs new research 
although the public nature of the programme and sensitivity of the research topic 
limit the scope of research.
18
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The management of overall safety and the application of a graded approach to the 
safety issues arising at nuclear power plants are becoming increasingly important 
when preparing for the very long-term operation of existing nuclear power plants 
and constructing new capacity that is planned for 60 years of operations. The 
systemic approach to safety and the roles of major actors such as the licensee, the 
Government and the regulator in building a national nuclear safety regime need 
to be understood. An integrated approach to safety, security, safeguards, society, 
standardisation and the sustainable use of nuclear energy highlights the need 
for vigilance. A strong safety culture is the driving force that enables the timely 
identification of safety issues, their assessment and the implementation of safety 
improvements.
The new programme also aims to maintain constant funding for research or to raise 
funding slightly from the SAFIR2018 level. The goal is to increase the size of the 
programme by obtaining more international funding and jointly funded projects. 
Nuclear safety research including competitive projects and the development of 
infrastructure is expected to be maintained at an elevated level throughout the 
programme period along with the development of the national infrastructure 
needed for nuclear safety research. The VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety will be 
completed and actual research at the new facility will commence. The focus of 
the infrastructure development programme will shift to the thermal hydraulic 
experimental facilities at Lappeenranta University of Technology. The international 
Jules Horowitz research reactor is expected to be commissioned before the end of 
this programme period in 2022. 
The new programme SAFIR2022 continues its close cooperation with the national 
nuclear waste management programme KYT2022 funded by VYR. Overall safety, 
plant and fuel lifetime management, social issues and the development of nuclear 
safety research infrastructure are common topics for both research programmes.
The research programme will develop and create national nuclear safety 
assessment capability for solving future safety issues, international jointly funded 
research in nuclear specific areas and networking. The SAFIR2022 programme’s 
planning group defined the following as the mission for national nuclear safety 
programmes: 
19
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“National nuclear safety research aims at high national nuclear safety assess-
ment capability. It develops and creates expertise, experimental facilities as well 
as computational and assessment methods for solving future safety issues in 
close cooperation with competent international partners.” 
The vision of SAFIR2022 was defined as follows: 
“The SAFIR2022 research community is a vigilant, internationally recognised and 
strongly networked competence pool that carries out research on topics relevant 
to the safety of Finnish nuclear power plants on a high scientific level and with 
modern methods and experimental facilities.” 
The funding of the programme is focused on the core themes, which are nuclear 
specific areas such as reactor safety and the integrity of the reactor pressure vessel, 
primary circuit and containment. In nuclear safety related areas, co-operation is 
sought with research institutes and organisations that possess excellence in the 
topical area. However, in the SAFIR2022 programme the application of research and 
nuclear safety aspects are the focus. 
The SAFIR2022 Nuclear Safety Assessment Capability Model has been established 
and the following areas are looked at when assessing the development and 
creation of the national nuclear safety assessment capability for solving future 
safety issues: 1) human resources and experts; 2) validated safety assessment tools; 
3) nuclear safety research laboratories and research facilities; 4) career building, 
training and networking; 5) knowledge management and assets, and 6) general 
research programme indicators. The overarching goal for the programme and the 
following programme period until 2026 are presented in Section 3.2.
2.2 Starting the programme
In November 2017, the MEAE appointed the members of the planning group from 
the representatives of central organisations taking part in nuclear safety activities. 
The objective of the planning group was to produce the Framework Plan for 
the research programme, as well as a proposal for its organisation. The working 
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group was authorised when necessary to supplement its expertise by consulting 
permanent or temporary experts.
The working group, consisting of 15 members and a secretary, started its work in 
November 2017. The working group has supplemented its expertise by consulting 
experts and professionals from different organisations. The working group assembled 
and worked as a single body, but three groups were formed to write up proposals, one 
for each research area of the coming programme, along with a fourth group to discuss 
the management structure and general topics. As a part of the planning process, 
a workshop was held in Innopoli, with 70 delegates in attendance. The work of the 
workshop groups laid the foundation for the content of the Framework Plan. The new 
research programme spans four years from the beginning of 2019. The MEAE will 
appoint the Management Board of the new research programme and will publish the 
call for proposals for the 2019 research projects in August 2018.
In January 2018, the MEAE announced a call for tender from organisations that 
could conduct the research programme’s administration project, and chose the 
administration organisation and director of the new programme in March 2018.
2.3 Programme administration
The programme’s operating model consists of a Management Board and 
four research area steering groups working under its supervision, as well as 
reference groups that are responsible for scientific and technical guidance of the 
projects (Figure 2.1). The administration of the programme is conducted by the 
administrative unit and Programme Director, which have been appointed on the 
basis of the competitive bidding. 
The research areas of the SAFIR2022 programme are:
• Plant safety and systemic approach to safety
• Reactor safety
• Structural safety and materials
• Research infrastructure 
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Research will be carried out in projects led by project managers. The research topics 
of the projects may be related to one or more research areas but administratively 
each project will be placed in one research area. Projects are also placed in a 
reference group assigned by the steering group for the research area. 
The administrative practices of the research programme will be described in detail 
in an operational management handbook. The principle of independence will be 
applied in selecting and monitoring the projects. Therefore, a person working on 
a project cannot be a member of the programme’s steering group or the reference 
group of the research area in question. 
The MEAE will appoint a Management Board for the programme that includes 
representatives of central nuclear safety organisations. The Management Board 
will nominate the research area steering groups and reference groups. The 
Management Board also appoints the chairpersons and members of the steering 
and reference groups. A reference group will be appointed in the SAFIR2018 
programme for the development of research infrastructure
2.3.1 Management Board
The Management Board is responsible for the programme as a whole and its results 
so that the programme meets the statutory requirements. The Management Board 
also decides on the project portfolio, monitors the implementation of the research 
programme and updates the Framework Plan for each call for proposals, if needed. 
The Management Board prepares a proposal for the MEAE on the projects for the 
next year, and the MEAE will prepare a statutory funding proposal to VYR after 
receiving a statement from STUK.
The chair of the Management Board is appointed from the Radiation and Nuclear 
Safety Authority (STUK) and the director of the programme acts as the secretary. 
One representative from each power company in the nuclear energy sector will 
be selected for the Management Board, along with a representative from every 
significant research institution and university carrying out nuclear research 
or education, and a representative from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Employment (MEAE). The MEAE contact person will also serve as the Finnish State 
Nuclear Waste Management Fund (VYR) contact person. A deputy member will be 
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appointed for each member. The Management Board’s mandate will end on  
31 March 2023. The participating organisations will cover the participation 
expenses of their representatives.
The Management Board defines the research area steering groups and reference 
groups. The Management Board also appoints the chairpersons, vice chairpersons 
and members of the steering and reference groups on the basis of proposals made 
by their organisations. 
Figure 2.1 Structure of the programme’s administration. Each project belongs to one reference 
group and its topic may be related to one or several research areas. The reference groups of the 
SAFIR2022 programme will be defined once the programme has started.
RG3 … … RGN
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systemic approach 
to safety
Reactor safety
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infrastructure
Programme 
Director
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RG1 RG2
 
The Management Board will meet when needed and, as a general rule, three times 
a year (March, June, December).
The decisions of the Management Board will be recorded in the meeting minutes, 
which will be distributed to the organisations taking part in the SAFIR2022 
programme.
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2.3.2 Research area steering groups
The research area steering groups are responsible for the content and results of the 
research programme in their respective fields; they prepare the calls for proposals 
for their fields, evaluate research project proposals and place the projects in the 
reference groups. The groups also promote the emergence of multidisciplinary 
research projects and are responsible for updates to the research areas’ plans and 
annual areas of focus. A steering group can propose the establishment of new 
reference groups in its own area and also propose multidisciplinary groups to the 
Management Board.
The steering groups are responsible for monitoring the research projects in 
their fields and for reporting to the Management Board. They also rely on the 
competence of the reference groups when monitoring the progress of research in 
the projects and when otherwise necessary. The steering groups must ensure that 
the achieved results and realised costs of the projects are in line with the funding 
decisions. A steering group will approve changes in the project plan when they are 
substantial or require changes in the budget. A steering group also approves the 
corresponding budget changes.
The chair of a steering group for an area is appointed from STUK and the director 
of the programme acts as the secretary. One representative from each power 
company in the nuclear energy sector will be appointed to a steering group.  
A deputy member will be appointed for each steering group member.
The steering groups will meet when needed and, as a general rule, three times a 
year (March, May, November). The results of the research projects of the preceding 
year and the updated project plans of the starting year will be assessed in the 
March meeting. The proposals for the next year are evaluated in the November 
meeting.
The decisions of a steering group and its proposals for the Management Board will 
be documented in the minutes distributed to the management group, reference 
groups and the project managers involved.
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2.3.3 Reference groups
The reference groups are responsible for the scientific and technological guidance 
of the research. They also decide on necessary changes in project plans concerning 
the research content as the work progresses when the changes do not require 
changes in the project budget or are not substantial. The members of the reference 
groups may evaluate the scientific level and content of the research project 
proposals upon request of the steering group of the research area.
The Management Board will confirm the research topics and composition of each 
reference group on the basis of the proposal of the steering group of the research 
area. New reference groups can be set up and old ones terminated during the 
programme. 
The chairperson of a reference group is a representative of a nuclear energy 
company or STUK or another recognised expert in the field. Its secretary will be a 
project manager on a rotational basis. Experts will be appointed to the reference 
group so that each company in the nuclear energy sector, STUK and the research 
organisations responsible for the projects in the group are represented by at least 
one person; when necessary, other experts may be included. Deputy members may 
be appointed for each organisation represented.
Minutes are prepared of the meetings of the reference groups, in which any 
decisions concerning the content of the projects and the proposals to be made 
to the steering or management groups will be documented. The minutes will be 
distributed to the Management Board, the research area steering groups and the 
project managers in question. The reference group will meet when needed and, as 
a general rule, three times a year (February, May, October).
2.3.4 Programme Director and administration organisation
The Programme Director and the administrative organisation are responsible for 
the administration of the programme. They are chosen on the basis of competitive 
bidding. The duties of the director and the administrative organisation are specified 
in a contract and separate annual orders and appended offers for each year.  
A project coordinator assists the Programme Director in the administration and 
acts as a substitute in meetings if necessary. Assisting staff of the administrative 
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organisation also participate in meeting and seminar arrangements, updating the 
website, etc.
The director and the administrative organisation prepare the meetings of the 
Management Board and implement its decisions, maintain the programme’s 
website and take care of international cooperation at the programme level 
and promote international collaboration. The Programme Director and the 
administrative organisation also prepare topics to be discussed in the steering 
group meetings and see to the co-ordination between reference groups and 
projects. 
Twice a year (at the end of October and January), the Programme Director and the 
administrative organisation collect cost summaries and content-based progress 
reports of the projects, assessed by the reference groups, for the steering group 
meetings in order to assist the approval of the invoicing. The Programme Director 
participates in the meetings of the Management Board, steering groups and the 
reference groups.
The director and the administrative organisation prepare the annual plan for the 
programme, the annual report and other required reports and follow up costs to 
serve as a basis for invoicing VYR. The administrative organisation co-ordinates the 
annual call for proposals for VYR-funded projects in accordance with the guidance 
of the MEAE and the Management Board.
The Programme Director and the administrative organisation promote and present 
the programme, develop its activities and maintain an operational management 
handbook and other guidelines internal to the programme.
The Programme Director and administrative organisation of the programme 
organise an interim and a final seminar as decided by the Management Board, as 
well as other common functions of the programme.
The Programme Director and the administrative organisation also assist the MEAE 
in other tasks related to the programme.
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2.3.5 Project manager, research group and research execution 
organisation
Research projects are led by a project manager who also participates in research 
activities together with other researchers in the project. The project manager and 
the organisation the manager represents are responsible for executing the project 
according to the project plan and the budget, and according to the decisions of 
the steering group of the research area. The project manager is responsible for the 
realisation of the whole project and leads the communication within the project’s 
research group, other projects, the reference group guiding the project and the 
programme management. The project manager is responsible for the reporting 
obligations set for the project in the programme. 
Ad hoc project meetings with participants from the organisations with members in 
the related reference group should be organised as often as needed and their main 
findings should be reported in the reference group meetings. The ad hoc meetings 
may be project-specific but also informal meetings with several projects dealing 
with the same research topic are encouraged.
2.4 Project portfolio and procedure for calls for proposals
The research projects in the programme shall have ambitious goals and be of 
high quality by international standards. The project objectives can be application-
oriented or they can develop and maintain basic competence recognised as 
important in the Framework Plan. Applied projects can create new scientific results 
or bring known results into practical use in a new way. Projects that develop and 
maintain basic competence ensure that Finland has the necessary expertise, 
validated methods and experimental facilities for the safe use of nuclear power.
The project plans should demonstrate the novelty of the research, show how 
the project will strengthen Finnish competence in nuclear safety and promote 
international networking and collaboration among the actors in the area. The 
application of practices from other industries may also be suitable research topics. 
Doctoral theses demonstrate the qualifications of the researchers and the scientific 
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novelty of the findings. However, in addition to these, the work must also be 
significant to the research programme.
Clear goals and tasks must be set for each project funded in the programme. The 
steering groups must be able to assess how the goals have been met during the 
project year and at its end. The plan for each project year must contain interim 
goals that can be assessed at the end of October and the goals for the entire project 
year that are assessed at the end of the project year in January.
A call for proposals will be announced annually in early autumn regarding projects 
proposed for funding by VYR. Project proposals can be made for one or several years. 
If funding is granted for a project longer than one year, further funding will generally 
be granted for it according to the project plan. However, the Management Board may 
propose to the MEAE and VYR that the funding is reduced from the original plan. In 
particular, the assessment considers whether the project has progressed as planned 
and whether changes in the operating environment have affected how effectively the 
project’s goals can be met or the significance of the goals.
In addition to actual research projects, the SAFIR2022 Management Board can 
annually initiate small studies with the order procedure. Decisions on the study 
projects will be made after the evaluation of the proposals for the annual call. The 
small study projects will support the implementation of the Framework Plan in topics 
that are not covered by actual research projects. They can also introduce new topics.
The Management Board will annually reserve a certain proportion of the available 
VYR funding for one- or two-year research projects and small studies. New 
innovative topics with bigger risks are recommended to be started as one- or two-
year projects. The longer projects shall focus on competencies that have already 
been recognised as important for nuclear safety in Finland. Doctoral theses can be 
included as parts of the longer projects.
The selection criteria for project proposals to be funded are the projects’ ability to 
develop expertise, methods, experimental facilities and networking in the field. 
In particular, the implementation of the requirement of Chapter 7a of the Nuclear 
Energy Act will receive special attention. The requirement is to ensure that the 
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authorities have sufficient expertise and methods at their immediate disposal if it is 
necessary to assess the safety significance of new issues that may emerge.
The steering groups of the research areas in the SAFIR2022 programme assess 
the project proposals, and the programme’s Management Board will make an 
annual proposal to the MEAE on the research projects to be funded. The MEAE will 
make a proposal to VYR of one project entity that meets the requirements of the 
Nuclear Energy Act after consulting with STUK. The funding proposal for multi-year 
projects may differ from the plan proposed at the beginning of the project, as the 
emphases of the research programme’s goals or the projects’ competitive situation 
may change. The management group may also propose a multi-year project is 
terminated. The selection procedure for research projects will be described in detail 
in the research programme’s operational management guide.
During the project evaluation phase, the Management Board has the possibility of 
negotiating with the parties proposing projects and with the funders on changing 
the goals and funding, and on combining project proposals into larger entities. It is 
also possible to propose projects for the research programme for which funding is 
not applied from VYR. The management group will decide whether to include them 
in the project portfolio. A common criterion for all research projects within the 
programme is compliance with the Framework Plan.
When planning the projects and defining the funding share applied from VYR, the 
nature of the work to be carried out in the project should be taken into account. 
The project plan must consist of partial tasks aimed at a consistent goal and it 
must have clear interim goals, the attainment of which can be assessed during the 
project year and at its end.
Research institutions, organisations carrying out technological research and 
universities may receive VYR funding for up to 70% of the project’s total expenses. 
For the participation fees related to international treaties, however, 100% VYR 
funding is possible. 
Funding can also be granted to companies that are truly committed to the field of 
research. For these companies, 100% VYR funding is possible. Companies with 50 
or fewer employees can report 50% indirect employee costs (“henkilösivukulut”) 
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and 30% general overhead costs (“yleiskulut”). A company can also propose larger 
general overhead costs in reporting, but then it should be based on accounting. For 
bigger companies, the acceptable indirect employee and general overhead costs 
are 50% and 50%, respectively.
In addition, the de minimis rule of the EU state subsidy regulations will be applied 
to companies. If necessary, the EU Commission will be notified of the research 
programme by a decision of the MEAE.
2.5 Results of the research programme
The main purpose of the research programme is to enhance the Finnish nuclear safety 
assessment capability for solving future safety issues as they appear. This capability is 
assessed against the goal set in the Nuclear Energy Act, Section 53, and more detailed 
using the SAFIR Nuclear Safety Assessment Capability Model presented in Appendix 
1. The key areas to be assessed in the capability model are: 1) human resources and 
experts, 2) validated safety assessment tools, 3) nuclear safety research laboratories 
and research facilities, 4) career building and training and networking, 5) knowledge 
management and assets and 6) general research programme indicators.
The goals for the SAFIR2022 programme and beyond until 2026 are presented 
under eight topics. All of the research projects funded develop or create nuclear 
safety assessment capability building in Finland. The overarching topics express 
more specific goals for the programme period. The list below presents the 
overarching research topics for which the milestones are presented in Section 3.2.
  1. Nuclear safety assessment capability building 
  2. Overall safety and systemic approach to safety 
  3. Validated tools for reactor and nuclear power plant analysis 
  4. Nuclear fuel and its lifecycle from reactor to final disposal 
  5. Ageing phenomena and the integrity of barriers 
  6. Severe accidents 
  7. External hazards 
  8. Nuclear safety in a changing environment
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The research programme is subject to international independent review at the end 
of the programme period. With respect to the research programme’s processes and 
structures, the programme is evaluated on the basis of internal audits and reviews. 
The annual Management Board review will assess the need for the development 
of the operating processes and decide on improvements to the processes and 
structures.
2.6 Principles of publicity, rights and responsibilities
The instruments, machines, software and results obtained or developed in the 
research programme are the property of the performing organisation unless 
otherwise agreed.
Decisions concerning the publicity of research results will be made between the 
contact person named in the funding agreement and the organisation responsible 
for the research. As a general rule, research results have to be publishable 
(Nuclear Energy Act, Section 53 d). Publications from the research programme 
will be collected annually for delivery in a suitable format for internal use by the 
organisations participating in the research programme.
If the aim of a project is to develop new software, either entirely or mostly with 
VYR funding, the official bodies and other organisations taking part in the research 
programme have the right to use the named software according to specified terms. 
Charges for use of the software will be agreed on a case-by-case basis.
The organisation with the main responsibility for a research project is in charge of 
the completion and reporting of the research, in accordance with the agreement 
with VYR. The project manager for the organisation with the main responsibility 
is the contact person. The organisation with the main responsibility is responsible 
for the appropriate archiving of the research results in line with the operational 
management handbook. Funding terms attached to the orders define the invoicing 
schedule and conditions.
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The administrative organisation appointed and the Programme Director are 
responsible for the administration of the programme. The responsibilities of the 
administrative organisation are defined in the order and the financing terms of the 
administrative project. 
All VYR-funded projects shall provide their Finnish participants and the SAFIR2022 
organisations with access to the research results.
2.7 Communication on the research and information 
exchange
The research programme plays a significant role in educating new experts and in 
knowledge transfer. Learning takes place by participating in research work under 
the guidance of more experienced researchers. University theses are part of the 
reporting of the results. High-quality research, international collaboration and novel 
connections with new areas of science and technology deepen and broaden the 
competence of more experienced researchers as well. 
Attaining a deep level of competence requires postgraduate studies and a doctoral 
thesis. The numbers of doctoral and other theses are important result indicators of 
the SAFIR2022 programme. Postgraduate studies with scientific publications also 
increase the long-term nature and the scientific level of the research work.
Working as a member on the programme’s Management Board, in the steering 
groups and the reference groups is important for information exchange between 
research and end user organisations. The research results will be spread among 
end users and the end users’ needs to researchers. The programme’s seminars and 
project-specific ad hoc meetings also serve as efficient channels for information 
exchange. 
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2.8 Co-operation with nuclear energy research and 
doctoral training programmes in Finland
Nuclear energy research in Finland is divided among diverse organisations. Most 
of the publicly funded research and development is conducted at the Technical 
Research Centre of Finland Ltd (VTT). Other major research institutions are Aalto 
University, Lappeenranta University of Technology (LUT), the Geological Survey of 
Finland (GTK), the Finnish Meteorological Institute and the universities of Helsinki, 
Oulu, Eastern Finland and Jyväskylä, the Tampere University of Technology and the 
Finnish Institute of Occupational Health. In addition, STUK, Fortum, Teollisuuden 
Voima Oyj (TVO) and Posiva Oy have funded their own research and various 
projects conducted outside of Finland.
The total scope of nuclear energy research in Finland is approximately EUR 75 
million annually. The most significant funders of the research are VYR, Business 
Finland, Euratom and occasionally the Academy of Finland. Other financers include 
VTT, STUK, universities, power companies, NKS and various EU funding channels.
More than half of the research funding has been applied to nuclear waste 
management research. Most of that is research funded by the owners of Posiva 
Oy, focusing on the safe disposal of nuclear waste. A major role is played by 
the ONKALO research facility in Olkiluoto. The Finnish Research Programme on 
Nuclear Waste Management KYT2018 (2015–2018) is implementing some of the 
technical and scientific projects of the previous programme phase, with the aim 
of reinforcing national competence. The objective is to develop and maintain the 
basic competence needed for carrying out the planned nuclear waste management 
solutions in Finland. The projects are divided into strategic analyses and projects 
that deal with the long-term safety of the geological disposal of spent fuel. The 
KYT2018 research projects involve VTT, GTK and several universities. The new 
research programme, KYT2022, is under preparation in conjunction with the 
preparation of SAFIR2022.
The SAFIR2018 nuclear safety research programme has accounted for 
approximately half of all the nuclear safety research in Finland by volume. Other 
nuclear safety research comprises projects funded exclusively or jointly by power 
companies, research institutions and universities. Research conducted by Fortum 
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focuses on questions concerning Loviisa VVER-440-type plants—for instance, in 
relation to material ageing, thermal hydraulics, nuclear fuel, reactor technology 
and plant technology. TVO’s research focuses on matters such as fuel and specific 
questions concerning the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units and, in the future, also 
Olkiluoto 3. Fennovoima’s future needs will be focused on technical solutions 
for the Hanhikivi 1 unit. VTT has conducted reactor safety research outside of 
SAFIR2018, particularly within Euratom projects. Other research funded by VTT 
includes research on next-generation reactors (GenIV) and the development of 
internal competence that cannot be included in national research programmes.
The Academy of Finland has funded nuclear technology-related research through 
a dedicated call and through its Sustainable Energy programme in the past. At 
present, the funding for basic research in this area is absent. National research 
collaboration has been strengthened, particularly between VTT, Aalto University 
and Lappeenranta University of Technology, by participating in infrastructure 
roadmap development.
The main aim of the Research Partnership in Fusion Energy (Euratom–Tekes 
association until 2013, from then on the EUROfusion Consortium) is to develop 
technology that interests Finnish industry for the ITER experimental reactor, and 
to participate in a carefully focused manner in fusion research being conducted 
in the EU alongside ITER. The research areas of the technology programme are 
fusion plasma research, plasma–wall interactions, fusion reactor material research, 
the development of superconductive wires, remote controlled maintenance 
systems and systemic studies. The focal points of Finnish fusion energy research 
are evaluated according to the focal points of the European Fusion Programme, 
which ensures maximum benefits for the product deliveries and competence 
development of Finnish companies.
In January 2013, the MEAE appointed a committee to prepare the research strategy 
for the nuclear energy field until 2030. The preparation was based on the report of 
the national competence working group on the nuclear energy field that finished 
its work in March 2012 [4]. The strategies were published in April 2014 [5]. Of the 
recommendations in the strategy, “The areas of focus of the nuclear energy research 
must be assembled into broad national programmes” touches the SAFIR2022 
programme directly. The recommendation states that the basis for nuclear safety 
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and nuclear waste management research is still comprised of the national research 
programmes in these areas. In addition, it is recommended that national research 
programmes for radiation safety research and future nuclear energy research 
(fission and fusion) should be set up. 
Universities, research institutions, authorities and the industry must be committed 
to supporting a multi-sector and multidisciplinary doctoral programme network 
and to the long-term funding of researcher training. The SAFIR programmes play 
an important role in supporting researcher training in the field of nuclear safety. 
The collaboration of all organisations is essential, particularly with respect to the 
exchange of researchers across sectoral boundaries. The Doctoral Programme for 
Nuclear Engineering and Radiochemistry, active in 2012–2015, co-ordinated by 
Aalto University was a prime example of broad-scale collaboration partially funded 
by the power companies along with the Academy of Finland. The collaboration 
continues within the scope of the national Doctoral Education Network in Nuclear 
Science and Technology set up in 2016 through common events such as workshops 
and summer schools, but without funding for doctoral research.
2.9 International co-operation
2.9.1 International co-operation as part of the research programme
International co-operation is a necessity in the nuclear power field, particularly 
but not limited to small nuclear power countries such as Finland. Co-operation 
enables access to larger research projects in Europe and elsewhere, thus ensuring 
a sustainable critical mass of necessary competence. In addition, co-operation is 
needed for performing large-scale experiments aimed at the validation of safety 
assessment analysis codes. International co-operation can also provide safety 
analysis software the use of which in Finland would otherwise remain limited or 
maintenance would not be possible [5]. 
The international co-operation included in the research programme must support 
the implementation of the goals of the research programme and benefit Finnish 
nuclear safety research as efficiently as possible. In the SAFIR2022 programme, 
international research collaboration emphasises OECD/NEA experimental and state-
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of-art-survey projects between member countries as well as participation in the 
Nordic NKS collaboration. In various committees of the OECD/NEA and IAEA, only 
actual research projects and equivalent development of nuclear safety assessment 
capability is funded by the SAFIR2022 programme. As an example, Finland’s 
participation in OCED/NEA large-scale experiments, including safety assessment 
code validation activities and in the USR NRC CAMP and CSARP projects, has 
also been channelled through the research programme. Moreover, Finland has 
taken part and partly lead the survey projects concerning state-of-art solutions in 
seismic hazards and utility monitoring systems in order to better understand the 
assessment criteria between low, intermediate and high-level seismicity areas.
Figure 2.2 International co-operation in SAFIR2022 research programme.
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Research cooperation within European and Scandinavian countries is considered 
beneficial due to the shared expectation of a high level of nuclear safety, strong 
safety culture and common environment for the use of nuclear energy. In nuclear 
safety, joint projects receiving funding from Finland and Sweden have been carried 
out in the SAFIR2018 programme. This co-operation is expected to increase in 
the coming programme period as the joint research with Energiforsk is expected 
to increase. This cooperation with Energiforsk started with research on polymer 
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ageing and has been widened to include research on Barsebäck reactor pressure 
vessel materials. Measures have been taken to enhance co-operation between 
the SAFIR research programme and EURATOM nuclear safety research projects in 
Horizon 2020. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed by NUGENIA 
and the MEAE in 2016 with the aim of further enhancing co-operation between the 
SAFIR2022 programme and European nuclear safety research. 
Results from earlier programmes, a strong Framework Plan and an interesting 
research entity of the new programme with subsequent high-quality results will 
make the SAFIR2022 programme an internationally desired contract partner. The 
forms and practical implementation of international co-operation are discussed 
below from the perspective of the SAFIR2022 programme. However, it must be 
considered that international co-operation is bidirectional. 
2.9.2 Forms of international co-operation in the programme
In the new programme, the established practice for the OECD/NEA experimental 
projects and NKS project along with Scandinavian jointly funded projects that 
have proven functional should be continued. Particular attention must be paid to 
the existing projects, which continue during the change over from one research 
programme period to the next. The continuation of the projects and ensuring the 
utilisation of the results of the projects is considered crucial. It is also important as 
part of the new programme to more effectively use the experimental projects for 
training new researchers and familiarising them with international networking, as 
well as developing their skills in communicating their research. The international 
co-operation and international experimental work at the Finnish new hot cell 
facilities at VTT CNS and the Nuclear Engineering Laboratory at LUT should be 
promoted.
In the new research programme, participation in the IAEA and OECD/NEA 
committee and workgroup activities is also important. This work can be included 
in the research programme within the available resources when the work directly 
serves the purpose of the research project or research project entity in question and 
produces clear research output that can be reported to the research programme. 
The same applies to summer schools arranged by the IAEA, OECD/NEA or ETSON for 
junior researchers.
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The most challenging areas of the international collaboration of the SAFIR2022 
programme are collaboration with the EU projects and the NUGENIA community’s 
research projects based on agreements. With both of these, it should be ensured 
that the collaboration promotes the SAFIR2022 programme’s goals in a measurable 
way. In addition, the collaboration should benefit Finnish nuclear safety research 
as much as possible, and should be capable of being implemented within VYR’s 
funding terms.
Research focuses on second and third generation fission reactors (but the 
development of future technologies is considered as necessary) and therefore the 
NUGENIA Association is a natural partner for the SAFIR2022 programme. NUGENIA 
is a part of the European Sustainable Energy Technology Platform (SNETP). 
The Finnish laboratory assets for nuclear safety research are enhanced not only in 
Finland but also abroad after the commissioning of The Jules Horowitz research 
reactor (JHR) in France. The JHR will be the key reactor in Europe concentrating 
on research into materials and nuclear fuels. The material tests are expected 
to be shifted from the Halden Research Reactor in Norway to the JHR. The new 
reactor is scheduled for completion by around 2022, and the first experimental 
programmes will start in 2024. Through VTT, Finland will have a 2% share of the 
reactor’s research capacity and corresponding expenses. Planning for the utilisation 
of the JHR will most likely be commenced in the SAFIR2022 programme. Through 
the representation of VTT, Finland participates in all significant decision-making 
bodies and workgroups related to the planning of the use of the JHR. When the 
JHR is operational, the research in the OECD/NEA Halden research reactor will 
near the end of its useful life. Based on a comprehensive strategic review, IFE’s 
board has concluded in June 2018 that the IFE will not apply for a new operating 
license after 2020 and that the Halden reactor will not be restarted. However, the 
nuclear research activities will continue in Halden. The reactor itself will turn to a 
decommissioning phase. Therefore, a major part of the fuel research in the current 
SAFIR2018 programme will move to the JHR.   
The nuclear energy research strategy published by the MEAE in 2014 identifies 
existing, emerging and potential countries for bilateral collaboration where 
collaboration can take place either within the framework of a collaboration 
agreement between two existing organisations or through “Business Finland” 
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activities between several Finnish organisations. In so far as such collaboration 
meets the goals set for national nuclear safety research programmes and has been 
approved by the executive bodies of the research programme, proceeding on a 
case-by-case basis is recommended. Where commercial aspects play a significant 
role, the natural place of the collaboration is outside of the research programme.
2.9.3 Practical implementation
The essential components in the practical implementation of collaboration are 
agreements, rights and obligations of the programme and international partners 
with respect to tasks and the ownership, use and publishing rights of the output. 
For the OECD/NEA experimental projects, the present operating model – where 
the MEAE appoints the organisation representing Finland, the Management 
Board adds the project as part of a SAFIR2022 research project and appoints the 
representatives of the steering and programme groups – has proven functional. 
At the decision-making stage, attention should be paid to the internal Finnish 
communication within the programme and to the possibility of utilising the results 
of the experimental programme. It has been possible to pay the participation fee 
of the project directly from VYR funding, but the jointly funded part of the SAFIR 
research project has been applied for supervision of the project or safety analyses 
carried out. 
Similarly, the present operating model does not need to be changed for the 
SAFIR2022 programme with respect to US NRC, NKS, Halden and Energiforsk 
projects. The JHR collaboration in connection with the SAFIR2022 programme 
requires a separate agreement model when the collaboration becomes current.
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3 Research
3.1 SAFIR2022 operating environment – challenges and 
research needs
3.1.1 National operating environment
The planning period for national nuclear safety research for nuclear power plants 
until 2022 and beyond to 2026 involves regulatory review of construction licence 
applications and periodic safety reviews of nuclear power:
• The periodic safety review for Loviisa 1 and 2 NPP units: due 
2023.
• Decision on renewal of the operating licence for the Olkiluoto 
1 and 2 NPP units is under preparation at the time of writing 
this research Framework Plan. 
• An operating licence decision is to be made for the Olkiluoto 
3 plant unit. 
• A construction licence decision is to be made for the 
Hanhikivi 1 plant unit.
• VTT FiR research reactor decommissioning licence.
• Terrafame uranium enrichment facility operating licence.
During the coming planning period, significant modernisation projects will be 
carried out at the existing Loviisa 1 and 2 and Olkiluoto 1 and 2 nuclear plant units, 
the largest of which, by volume, is automation renewal. Plant improvements and 
modifications planned particularly because of the Fukushima accident will most 
likely be continued during the programme period. While the Framework Plan has 
already been prepared, the MEAE has been handling the construction licence 
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application for Hanhikivi 1. This application may also affect the related schedules 
and goal set for the new SAFIR2022 research programme. 
The national operating environment for nuclear power is changing with the 
changing energy system. Flexible operation of nuclear power plants may be a 
reality in Finland in the future. The technology changes and digitalisation may 
be utilised to enhance safety. Also, new reactor concepts, such as Small Modular 
Reactors (SMR), might be an attractive solution in new energy systems, and so their 
safety features and concepts need to be understood. The general views on these 
areas are introduced briefly in the following, and more detailed research needs are 
identified in Sections 3.3–3.5.
Flexible operations
One factor affecting the national operating environment is the increased need 
for flexible operations, such as different modes of load following. Instead of 
researching flexible operation per se, it is proposed that the possible effects of 
flexible operations should be taken into account in the research in different areas, 
such as the behaviour of materials and structures, thermal hydraulic and reactor 
phenomena, the safety effects of external demands, the role of automation and the 
effect on control room operations.
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Figure 3.1 Estimated schedule for licence applications and renewal projects of operating nuclear 
power plants and those under construction and design in Finland.
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Technological changes and development
There are lots of changes ongoing continuously in the technology that provide 
possibilities for gathering and processing information more efficiently than by the 
current methods employed in the nuclear industry. These methods could make it 
possible to gain a better understanding of different issues, and the identification 
of these methods could be utilised to improve nuclear safety. Simultaneously, it 
should be understood how to implement them to avoid possible adverse effects.
One example of technology changes and development is a digital nuclear power 
plant, which is a future development direction for the multi-physics/multi-scale 
simulation technology. A digital NPP covers a wide range of technologies and 
corresponding research needs, and could be fruitful for novel research.
In the future, machine learning, big data, robotic process automation and artificial 
intelligence, for example, will be more and more prevalent. Such applications, 
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utilised by other industries, should be considered for their potential to be applied in 
nuclear power. They have the potential to improve nuclear safety by cost-effective 
means.
More broadly, the emergence of digital networking and societal aspects, including 
social media and cloud services, are also changes to be taken into account. 
Small modular reactors
The possible safety aspects of small modular reactors could create an entity large 
enough to justify research targeted at SMRs only. However, it is encouraged that 
SMRs will be considered as a part of research in different areas, similarly with 
flexible operations. The possible aspects for research regarding SMRs are, but not 
limited to, safety philosophy, physical barriers in novel solutions, emergency zone 
requirements, simulation and other computational methods, and new operating 
concepts.
3.1.2 Regulatory environment
The global nature of activities related to the use of nuclear energy and networking 
highlights the importance of national safety research. The principle of continuous 
improvement is applied to international safety requirements and safety guides. The 
most significant changes to the safety requirement levels were made after the Three 
Mile Island accident in 1978, the Chernobyl accident in 1986 and the Fukushima 
Daiichi accident in Japan in 2011. Both the international safety standards and the 
Finnish YVL Guides have been developed with mostly large (>300 MWe) light water 
reactors in mind, where the fuel is in the form of uranium dioxide with zirconium-
based cladding and the safety philosophy mainly relies on so-called active safety 
systems (those that require external operating power). At the time of writing this 
SAFIR2022 Framework Plan, the international forums, such as IAEA and OECD/NEA, 
have started discussions on technology independent safety requirements, issues 
to be considered when licensing Small Modular Reactors (SMR) or passive front line 
safety systems and accident tolerant fuel materials.
The idea of limiting the impact of severe accidents on the environment has been 
integrated into the EU directive on nuclear safety, IAEA safety requirements and 
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WENRA recommendations as a goal for the design of a nuclear power plant 
after the Fukushima Daiichi accident in Japan in 2011. Therefore, early releases 
or large releases shall be practically eliminated. Other lessons learned from 
the Fukushima Daiichi accident integrated into the international requirements 
and recommendations deal with the independence of the regulatory body, 
transparency, leadership and management for safety, enhancement of defence 
in depth of nuclear power plants and safety improvements related to extreme 
external hazards. The development of the IAEA safety standards on SMRs or passive 
front line systems is not foreseen during the SAFIR2022 programme period.
In Finland, these requirements were considered during the total revision of 
the YVL Guides, which was completed in 2013, and the associated revision of 
the government decrees. In July 2015, STUK was authorised to issue binding 
regulations on technical details concerning nuclear safety principles. These 
regulations, repealing former government decrees (717/2013, 716/2013, 734/200, 
736/2008), were adopted on 22 December 2015 and came into force on 1 January 
2016:
• Regulation on the Safety of a Nuclear Power Plant (STUK 
Y/1/2016)
• Regulation on the Emergency Arrangements of a Nuclear 
Power Plant (STUK Y/2/2016)
• Regulation on Security in the Use of Nuclear Energy (STUK 
Y/3/2016)
• Regulation on the Safety of Disposal of Nuclear Waste (STUK 
Y/4/2016)
• Regulation on the Safety of Mining and Milling Operations 
Aimed at Producing Uranium or Thorium (STUK Y/5/2016).
The recent update of Nuclear Energy Act in 2017 considers the Nuclear Safety 
Directive Amendment (2014) and further enhances the Finnish nuclear safety 
framework. 
The development of European nuclear safety standards has started according to the 
recommendations of the study completed in 2013 by the European organisation 
CEN/CENELEC. The preparation of the new standards is implemented as global 
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collaboration; however, in some areas, such as the fields of construction technology 
and mechanics, standards based on the European premises may also be expected. 
Research preceding the standardisation related to the use of nuclear power is 
required for creating a solid foundation for the above work. For the research, the 
new regulatory environment further strengthens the need for consistent nuclear 
safety standards and procedures at the various operative levels internationally, 
while also incorporating new topics to nuclear safety research. 
3.1.3 Development of expertise
Only high-level national expertise can ensure the safe use of nuclear power. 
At present, Finland has nuclear power plants in all stages of their life cycle and 
licensing processes. Expertise is needed for both the long-term use of nuclear 
power plants and also for new plant options. The necessity for high-level national 
expertise has arisen during the safety assessment of events at the plants, the 
modernisation of the existing plants and in the construction of new capacity. 
National expertise cannot be outsourced. The SAFIR2022 Nuclear Safety Assessment 
Capability Model (see Appendix 1) has been developed to facilitate transparent, 
measureable development of national expertise required by the Nuclear Energy 
Act, Section 53. 
The use of nuclear energy is still undergoing a generation change while new actors 
are entering the field. This makes the maintenance and development of high-
level expertise at the national level particularly challenging. The generation that 
commissioned nuclear power plants in the 1970s and 1980s has mostly retired. 
Nuclear safety research and modernisation projects of the operating nuclear power 
plant plants and the use of operating experience of the nuclear power plants 
provide an opportunity for experts from different generations to work together, 
facilitating knowledge transfer to the younger generation. This ensures that 
the available experience of constructing and operating nuclear power plants is 
exploited in the best possible manner. 
A versatile and challenging operating environment has increased international 
interest in nuclear safety work and research carried out in this area in Finland. The 
diverse on-going projects of the licensees have increased the attractiveness of 
the companies in the field as employers, which is reflected in students’ interest in 
45
NATIONAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY RESEARCH 2019–2022 
SAFIR2022 FRAMEWORK PLAN
the field, as well as in the number of applications for vacant positions. Finland also 
hosts international research projects. The operating environment provides diverse 
possibilities for the further development of international collaboration and for the 
internationalisation of researchers.
3.1.4 Experimental facilities
Nuclear research experimental facilities in Finland are top quality in comparison 
to the whole of Europe. The recently commissioned VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety, 
the LUT facilities for thermal hydraulic studies, the forthcoming Jules Horowitz 
Materials Testing Reactor in France, of which Finland owns a share, and many 
other laboratory facilities mean Finland is one of the few countries in Europe 
capable of investing in new experimental facilities. At the European level, hot cell 
facilities exist in many countries, but in most cases they are coming to their end of 
lifetime. The closing of the Osiris reactor in France and the technical and economic 
problems with the Halden reactor in Norway have turned eyes towards the JHR. 
VTT CNS in combination with the capacity of the JHR provide us with excellent 
tools for material testing and research. They also provide a proper environment 
for educating new experts. Taking into account the fact that all experimental 
facilities are and will be national investments instead of private investments, the 
commitment of the Finnish nuclear community is very strong in increasing our 
competitiveness in research.
During the SAFIR2022 programme period the VTT CNS operation will reach full 
scale. The investment aid from the Government for the CNS will be continued up 
to 2020, after which it is LUT’s turn to take on their share of the renewal of the 
experimental equipment. At the same time, the JHR construction project will be 
finalised and the operation phase with the first experimental programme planned. 
LUT continues the development of experimental infrastructure by constructing a 
modern thermal hydraulic testing environment and in the meantime keeping the 
existing facilities operable until new facilities can replace the old ones. The main 
existing large facilities are PACTEL/PWR PACTEL and PPOOLEX, and the first step 
of the new development, MOTEL SMR, is currently under construction. There have 
been several separate effects facilities to address emerging issues in the past, and 
performing novel experiments on short notice is a special strength of LUT.
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Starting from 2021, the development of the research environment at LUT will be 
accelerated to have several different configurations of MOTEL available. The LUT 
test facilities have been, are and will be used in international cooperation; projects 
with EU, OECD/NEA and power utilities.
LUT is an active member of the NUGENIA innovation community and uses the 
NUGENIA Open Innovation Platform to share project ideas and gather partners for 
international projects (funded by, e.g. EU H2020). LUT’s experimental capabilities 
have also been needed in OECD/PKL projects, where PWR-PACTEL experiments are 
counterparts to PKL testing done by Areva in Germany. Furthermore, experimental 
capabilities developed under SAFIR programmes have also enabled or facilitated 
separate-effects testing with dedicated test sections for several domestic and 
international customers.
3.1.5 International operating environment and research topics 
The international nuclear safety research protectives are diverse: After the 
Fukushima Daiichi accident in 2011 some countries have decided to phase 
out the use of nuclear energy. On the other hand, in some countries, there are 
large investments in capacity building and international jointly funded research 
facility development. The extension of operation of GEN II reactors, start-up of 
GEN III reactors and the development of immersing technologies such as SMRs 
and accident tolerant fuel are among the driving interests of nuclear safety 
research worldwide. Even though the perspectives of international nuclear safety 
research are varied, depending on the current status of national nuclear energy 
programmes, the decisions on the phasing out of nuclear energy in European 
countries have not yet affected joint nuclear safety research. This may be due to the 
fact that the policy of maintaining expertise in nuclear safety assessment through 
research activities may be seen as an option in the new situation—for example, in 
Germany. An opposite development in the UK has led to the strong enhancement 
of national nuclear research. However, the impact of Brexit on the UK’s participation 
in European nuclear safety research projects is not yet known. 
Fukushima Daiichi will be visible in many ways in the research topics of 
international organisations, particularly those of the OECD/NEA—from the analysis 
of the course of the accident to a variety of waste management and radiation 
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protection issues. Research on the organisational, human and societal topics related 
to the Fukushima Daiichi accident has only started. It can be assumed that the topic 
will bring into research new questions on the actions of society and socio-technical 
communities. The systematic approach to safety is sought in different international 
forums. The management of supply chains for safety critical components is seen as 
a global challenge in the modern operating environment.
The OECD/NEA’s experimental safety research projects have systematically 
studied phenomena related to fuel, the reactor, thermal hydraulics, containment 
integrity, the functioning of the containment structure and cooling capabilities of 
a melted core. The validation of safety assessment tools is one of the key aspects 
of the OECD/NEA projects. The accident tolerant fuels and reactor pressure vessel 
materials as well as the severe accident management strategies are expected to 
be activated during the SAFIR2022 research programme period. The OECD/NEA 
projects related to fire and hydrogen management will continue.
The research topics presented in the SAFIR2022 programme are strongly linked to 
European nuclear safety research and largely shared with the NUGENIA Roadmap 
2013 and Euratom Nuclear Safety Research plans until 2020. The common topics 
in SAFIR2022 programme and the NKS-R programme – which is focused on 
thermal hydraulics, severe accidents, reactor physics, risk analysis and probabilistic 
methods, organisational issues and safety culture, decommissioning and plant life 
management including extension – establish the basis for nuclear safety research 
on nuclear power plants in operation in Scandinavian countries. Bilateral jointly 
funded projects are discussed above in chapter 2.
In addition, a continuation of the project concerning the Fukushima accident is 
underway and new information is gained on the severe accident behaviour of 
the reactor and the containment. Standards harmonisation work related to new 
facilities, carried out at the OECD/NEA, can be supported by research. Currently, 
the IAEA’s ISSC (International Seismic Safety Centre) unit, established after the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, serves as the collector of global 
seismic research data. The ISSC is an important body as a communicator of 
information related to external threats. The fuel research at the IAEA is concentrated 
at FUMEX.
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Figure 3.2 Safe use of nuclear energy.
3.2 SAFIR2022 Overarching topics and milestones 2022 
and beyond
The SAFIR2022 planning group established eight overarching topics for which 
research goals were set until 2022 and for the next programme period until 
2026. The need for multidisciplinary research and significance in achieving the 
programme goal characterise these chosen safety issues. The eight topical areas 
with the safety research goal are presented in Table 1. The goals are discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 3 and Appendix 1 “SAFIR2022 Nuclear Safety Assessment 
Capability Model”.
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Table 1. Overarching Safety Goals for SAFIR2022 programme and beyond.
Topic Overarching Goal 2022 Overarching Goal 2026
1. Nuclear safety 
assessment 
capability 
building
Appendix 1
VTT CNS Hot Cells commissioned and facility in 
operation 
LUT Thermal hydraulics laboratory renewal completed
Updating of impact test facility for current and future 
needs
Enhanced PRA modelling capabilities and applications 
for new technologies
Appendix 1
VTT CNS Hot Cells on-going projects
LUT Thermal hydraulics laboratory 
commissioned and projects running
Experimental work close to full-scale 
scenarios
Applications of enhanced PRA capabilities
2. Overall safety 
and systemic 
approach to 
safety
Approach for assessment of overall safety and systemic 
approach to safety developed
Modern methodology in control room assessment, 
systems engineering in design, I&C and electrical 
systems assessment in use
Insight for combining safety and security requirements 
achieved
Application of overall safety approach 
and systemic approach to safety 
assessments
Continued methodology development 
with moderns tools and for complex 
working environment
Insight for assessing combined safety and 
security issues achieved
3. Validated tools 
for reactor and 
nuclear power 
plant analysis
Availability of advanced analysis codes, flexible research 
facilities and accomplished safety experts able to 
address licensing questions and topical safety concerns. 
Analysis Codes and tools international benchmarking 
ongoing
Applications for the new set of analysis 
codes and tools ongoing, international 
publications for references, Commercial 
services for international customers.
4. Nuclear fuel 
and its lifecycle 
from reactor to 
final disposal
International experiments on fuel safety, experimental 
fuel research and use of test facilities and laboratories 
planned, international co-operation with JHR MTR 
planned
Rethinking the fuel safety criteria
Knowledge of accident tolerant fuel safety issues 
Full utilisation of national and 
international test and laboratory assets in 
international projects
5. Ageing 
phenomena 
and integrity of 
barriers
Enhanced understanding for ageing management of 
materials, structures and components. Understanding 
of all types of Reactor Pressure Vessel materials and new 
materials for 60/80 years lifetime, 
Developed safety and structural integrity analysis 
methods contributing structural integrity of materials, 
structures and components.
Non-destructive examination methods with high 
resolution for demanding components available, 
digitalisation.
Mastering aging management of 
materials, structures and components for 
safe and reliable LTO operation of nuclear 
power plants
Continuation of up-to-date R&D to 
maintain structural integrity of materials, 
structures and components
Enhanced reliability of non-destructive 
testing methods applied in structural 
integrity and safety of metal and 
concrete structures. 
Applications, commercial services, JHR 
MTR co-operation, bilateral co-operation
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6. Severe 
accidents
Integration of Fukushima lessons learned into Finnish 
context
Capability to assess all national severe accident 
approaches 
Codes and tools for assessing passive 
severe accident management
7. External 
hazards
Developing and maintaining sufficient understanding 
and assessment capabilities of seismic, meteorological 
and hydrological hazards, including the effects of 
climate change..
Capabilities for analytical or experimental qualification 
of structures and components for seismic events, air 
plane collision and explosions.
Continued methodology development
and maintenance of hazard estimates
8. Nuclear safety 
in a changing 
environment
Understanding SMR safety concepts and the Finnish 
nuclear safety regulation
Digitalisation as an opportunity for nuclear safety
Understanding the impact of changes in the energy 
systems and crating new research topics.
Deepened understanding of SMR  and 
safety requirements
Digital nuclear power plant concept
Development of necessary assessment 
methodologies.
Defining NPPs safe operating modes with 
increasing distributed/renewal electricity 
supply, 
 
The goals for 2026 are indicative and will serve as one input for the planning of the 
research programme period after SAFIR2022.
3.3 Overall safety and systemic approach to safety
3.3.1 Description of the research area
Overall safety and systemic approach to safety collects a wide range of nuclear 
safety research areas that are overarching between several topics, as well as topics 
affecting the nuclear power plant as a whole or that are present in several areas.
Such topics include the concept of overall safety itself, organisational issues, 
automation architecture, control room design and operations, human factors, 
external hazards, safety and security interfaces, electrical systems, setting the safety 
requirements, and controlling the plant design throughout the plant lifetime. All in 
all, practical implementation of a graded approach concept would benefit from a 
more holistic view of overall safety.
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3.3.2 Objectives of the research
The main objectives of the research area in the SAFIR2022 programme are to:
• further develop a structured approach to balanced safety 
requirements,
• maintain and develop know-how on conventional and 
modern MCRs (main control room),
• maintain and improve modelling capabilities of PRA 
(probabilistic risk assessment),
• deepen understanding of HOF (human and organisational 
factors) and HFE (human factors engineering) aspects, and
• further develop the framework for evaluation of overall 
safety.
It is expected that by the end of 2022 we will have available: 
• a methodology for evaluating the adequacy and balance of 
the requirements;
• an understanding of specific features and the safety concepts 
of SMRs and reflection to the current safety philosophy in 
Finnish nuclear regulation;
• the integrity of probabilistic and deterministic requirements 
to ensure adequate and fair application of defence-in-depth, 
including safety margins in the design;
• modern approaches to support and evaluate control room 
design;
• methods and tools to support a systems engineering 
approach in safety design;
• insight into how to optimally combine safety and security 
requirements; and
• sound design approaches of I&C and electrical architecture to 
ensure safety.
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The identified goals of the research that go beyond 2022 are to achieve:
• a tool to evaluate the adequacy and balance of the 
requirements;
• an understanding of and more detailed modelling of the 
system of organisations in order to evaluate systemic 
behaviour of the complex network in different situations; and
• a deepened understanding of SMR safety features and the 
implications for safety requirements.
It should be noted that these are not the only goals beyond the period for 
SAFIR2022, but they do represent general top-level objectives that need support 
from many research topics from different areas in SAFIR2022 and in KYT2022 in 
order to be achieved. It is expected that these will be further developed during 
SAFIR2022 when preparing for the following period and combining the SAFIR and 
KYT programmes.
Out of the overarching research topics of SAFIR2022 presented in Section 2.5, 
overall safety is directly linked with topics 2) overall safety and systemic approach 
to safety and 8) nuclear safety in changing environment. Due to its systemic and 
holistic nature, overall safety also interacts with the other topics in the list.
3.3.3 Research needs
There are top level requirements for the use of nuclear energy in the Nuclear Energy 
Act (990/1987). The driving principle is that “the use of nuclear energy, taking 
into account its various effects, shall be in line with the overall good of society” 
(990/1987, Section 5). Furthermore, “the use of nuclear energy must be safe; it shall 
not cause injury to people, or damage to the environment or property” (990/1987, 
Section 6). The requirements concerning safety are further elaborated on in Chapter 
2 A of the Nuclear Energy Act, where the guiding principles state that “the safety 
of nuclear energy use shall be maintained at as high a level as practically possible. 
For the further development of safety, measures shall be implemented that can 
be considered justified considering operating experience and safety research and 
advances in science and technology” and that “safety requirements and measures to 
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ensure safety shall be sized and allocated to be commensurate to the risks related 
to the use of nuclear energy”.
3.3.3.1 General safety approach and balanced safety requirements
It appears that although the general principles are rather well formed and they 
have been applied for a long time, one can question how these actually affect 
the more detailed safety requirements. Especially the overall good establishes 
societal expectations for the use of nuclear energy, which is not usually addressed 
when setting safety requirements. This also includes financial effects of safety 
requirements, a topic often omitted in safety research, but affecting the societal 
acceptability of nuclear energy through the top level expectations above, and 
further the selection of reasonably practicable solutions for safety features and 
improvements. From the point of view of society, the relation of expectations may 
well include the approach to the overall concept of safety, how safety in general is 
perceived, how risk is perceived, or how to proportion nuclear safety risks to other 
risks. The balance of safety requirements that is asked for by having requirements 
commensurate to the risks usually takes into account the direct consequences of 
the operation and possible accidents, but including other expectations that affect 
the concept of safety may not be such an easy task. Still, these expectations are 
underlying when evaluating the overall good of society, and thus they somehow 
affect the balance and the structure of the safety requirements. To achieve 
and maintain a good structure and justified level of safety requirements, these 
underlying expectations should be understood adequately.
Balanced safety requirements provide that a graded approach is utilised when 
structuring the regulatory framework for nuclear safety. Deterministic and 
probabilistic arguments are both valid, and usually deterministic requirements set 
the range of aspects that need to be taken into account in the design and operation 
of the plant, whereas probabilistic requirements, in rough, set the reliability level of 
the means to take care of the situations defined deterministically. There should be a 
methodology available to evaluate the adequacy and balance of the requirements.
These aspects are valid also in the KYT2022 programme, and especially the overall 
safety or risk perception and the acceptability of use of nuclear energy should 
consider a wider perspective than that covered directly in SAFIR2022 only. 
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3.3.3.2 Overall safety concept and systemic approach to safety
An overall safety evaluation tries to answer the needs above partially. However, 
the concept of overall safety is not well established. Therefore, understanding the 
different aspects and areas of safety needs to be further studied. Understanding 
safety from a wider perspective would help to evaluate more comprehensively 
how different sub-areas are linked to each other and how they affect the overall 
picture. There is a need to establish methods to evaluate and assess overall safety, 
and it is essential to recognise and understand the systemic nature of the whole. 
With the more comprehensive approach, the contribution of different areas 
and their importance to overall safety can be identified, as well as the need to 
further enhance understanding of specific issues and identify gaps in knowledge. 
Furthermore, from the research programme point of view, it would be beneficial to 
understand how different research areas contribute to and support the assessment 
of overall safety.
There are several approaches to overall safety, some of which have been studied 
and developed in previous SAFIR programmes. Safety analysis reports (SAR, FSAR) 
are intended to comprise an overall safety view of a nuclear power plant. Regarding 
nuclear waste, a safety case is a corresponding overall safety representation. ISO 
15288 “Systems and software engineering – System life cycle processes”, a non-
nuclear standard widely adopted in safety significant industries, provides valuable 
background for overall safety. At least three dimensions of overall safety can be 
basically found considering a system of systems: technical architecture of a NPP, 
organisation of organisations and processes (systems engineering).
In order to promote the utilisation of the development in overall safety assessment 
frameworks, they should be tested in practice. A fruitful approach could be to apply 
them in SMRs that may have a different safety concept than those in current plant 
designs. The results may generate new ideas to develop the frameworks further and 
support improving the general safety approach and balanced safety requirements.
Although the responsibility for nuclear safety is with the licensee, different 
organisations have their own roles in the overall process dealing with safety related 
issues. Therefore, nuclear safety is affected by several different organisations, 
such as licensees, ministries, safety authorities, vendors, non-governmental 
organisations, the public and the media. Understanding how this system of 
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organisations works and how different organisations influence each other could 
help in balancing the different areas of overall safety and enhancing organisational 
strength in depth and transparency. This would require more detailed modelling 
of the system of organisations in order to evaluate systemic behaviour of the 
complex network in different situations. When studying overall safety from these 
perspectives, however, the explicit contribution to nuclear safety should be kept in 
focus.
3.3.3.3 Human and organisational factors
Human and organisational factors (HOF) affect all stages of safety related decision 
making; technology development and implementation, application of safety 
assessment methodologies and other daily activities at the utilities. Further work 
is needed to effectively integrate human and organisational factors knowledge 
to the nuclear context. It must be noted that this area is not isolated, but rather is 
part of other areas studied in the SAFIR programme, and therefore the interactions 
between different research topics should be identified and taken into account in 
the research. 
Human and organisational factors expertise in the nuclear domain require solid 
knowledge of the state of the art research in a broad spectrum of behavioural and 
organisational studies, as well as knowledge of the national safety regulations, 
international requirements, best practices and industry needs. It is essential to 
look after, maintain and further develop expertise in HOF themes that have been 
studied in the previous SAFIR programmes, such as safety culture and control room 
behaviour and validation. Expertise is needed, for example, to understand and 
evaluate the underlying organisational and human factor aspects of individual and 
group behaviour.
Novel viewpoints are needed because recent international requirements [IAEA 
GSR Part 2] have put more emphasis on the importance of leadership for safety. 
Assessment and improvement methods for leadership behaviour and management 
decision making are needed. Different aspects should be incorporated into 
the safety culture framework, and potentially conflicting objectives within the 
organisation should be part of the overall evaluation. One important issue in the 
future is the changes in the operation environment, when an organisation is facing 
56
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND EMPLOYMENT 22/2018
challenges to recruit and maintain expertise. This kind of situation may arise, for 
example, when a plant’s lifetime approaches its end. Knowledge and tools to 
support sufficiency of staffing and the means to maintain motivation are needed. 
Furthermore, the safety culture of different organisations and the effects of the 
differences or commonalities in these on the overall safety need to be understood. 
Nuclear industry organisations carry out different initiatives for improving, for 
example, safety culture, human performance, usability, project management, 
organisational learning and leadership, but the understanding of the effectiveness 
of these initiatives may remain vague, and could be studied to support their 
effective mutual prioritisation, implementation and integration at all levels of 
defence in depth.
Currently, it is clear that a human factors engineering (HFE) programme should 
be developed when designing modifications for control rooms and I&C user 
interfaces. However, the scope of HFE should not be limited to control rooms alone. 
The potential safety contribution of HFE in other modifications to NPP systems, 
structures and components should be better understood. Also, principles for 
grading HFE activities should be developed.
Digitalisation may bring about different kinds of new technological solutions to 
NPPs that can be used for monitoring the condition of the system and structures, 
analysing data, decision making, etc. The human-technology interaction challenges 
and their safety relevance should be better understood. 
The large proportion of abnormal events that take place in NPPs are related to 
human performance and human factors. Effectiveness and possible restraints 
to effectiveness of human performance development programmes should be 
understood better. The application of human performance tools in non-traditional 
areas, such as the prevention of human errors in design modifications, could be 
explored.
3.3.3.4 PRA
Balanced safety design is an important part of overall safety. An essential tool or 
methodology to evaluate this is probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), which gives 
core damage frequencies (CDF), large release frequencies (LRF), as well as large 
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early release frequencies (LERF) as outcomes. Furthermore, contributions from 
different events to these are included. The results in general can be reduced to 
frequencies above that and can be used as measures to support the evaluation of 
overall safety, but the results need to be examined from different perspectives. The 
models and data behind these results are vast, and the presentation of the results, 
including uncertainties, require efficient tools to highlight and understand different 
aspects. Efficient and versatile result presentation tools support the use of PRA in 
design and operation and help in decision making concerning risk balancing and 
the evaluation of the importance of operational events. PRA methodology could 
also be extended, with some precautions, to evaluate the balance of the regulatory 
safety requirements.
There are issues that need better analysis and modelling approaches in PRA studies. 
In many cases, however, PRA modelling power is sufficient, but the applicable 
data and reliability models are inadequate. Examples are digital I&C, hybrid or 
digital control rooms, human reliability aspects, maintenance errors, reliability of 
passive systems, long mission times, security aspects, and ageing aspects. These 
issues, however, cannot be just introduced to PRA models on the basis of current 
understanding. Rather, from the PRA point of view, it should be formulated what 
kind of information is needed, and the understanding of the issue itself should be 
increased by specific research to answer this demand. PRA methods should also be 
extended to better include assessment of the whole site, which could be especially 
important when assessing SMRs with several reactor units at a single site and units 
sharing common safety systems and staff.
Co-operation between deterministic design and PRA should be studied. 
Deterministic design and PRA benefit from each other especially when there is 
good information exchange in practice. Design areas such as seismic design and 
fire protection design should be supported in research in order to enforce the 
co-operation with corresponding PRA. Seismic design margins are assessed with 
extreme external hazard requirements (DEC-C) and it is important to review the 
methodology compared to different countries, such as in France. Defence in depth 
design of fire protection is assessed with PRA in order to ensure the functionality 
of safety systems and mitigation of fire spread against different kinds of fires. 
Methodology compared to different countries, such as the US, should be  
studied.
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It has been discussed that SMRs are safe enough to enable reduced emergency 
preparedness zones in the vicinity of the NPP. The possibility of an early release 
or a large radioactive release from SMRs creates a link between probabilistic 
consequence assessment (PRA level 3). To support this the modelling capabilities 
for PRA level 3 need to be developed further, which includes linking both PRA 
level 2 studies and environmental consequence analyses in a proper manner. 
Furthermore, the model development and research on this topic could provide 
insights to the overall safety of operating NPPs and those under construction and 
design.
3.3.3.5 Systems engineering
Tools to support design processes may help to ensure that safety requirements 
are adequately taken into account in the design and during design changes, help 
in configuration management as well as in taking into account inter-disciplinary 
effects. In general, these tools may help to treat the NPP as a whole. Although these 
tools may be mostly utilised by the licensees or the vendors, their development 
may enhance nuclear safety through more reliable requirement management, 
ensuring the integrity of the design, and the more fluent implementation of safety 
improvements. Model checking tools help in finding possible design errors, and 
they need to be further developed to support failure mode effect analyses. 
There are some safety requirements that might be mutually somewhat 
contradictory. Typical examples are requirements regarding the reliability of safety 
functions, avoiding inadvertent actions, and security issues, for which independent 
requirements exist but they are not necessarily coordinated as an entity. From 
this point, it should be better understood how functional and non-functional 
requirements should be combined to optimise the overall system efficiency instead 
of partial optimisation. Here, architecture, the system and component level should 
be considered by taking a systems engineering approach. A related issue worth 
considering is the overall safety level reached with qualified redundant systems 
compared with that of non-qualified but diverse systems, the latter potentially 
allowing for an even better safety level utilising industry level components, and 
leading to less complicated and more robust design.
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3.3.3.6 Safety and security interface
Security is one specific area within overall safety, but it is not fully isolated; there 
are interfaces with safety issues and it is important to identify what the sources of 
conflicting requirements are, and where requirements aim at the same outcome. 
It may be difficult to include research on specific security threats in the SAFIR2022 
programme, but a general approach may be studied from the point of view of 
how safety and security requirements are related and connected to each other, 
and what would be the optimal way of responding to the objectives above when 
developing the requirements. In particular, both safety and security issues should 
be considered systematically, such as utilising the systems engineering approach 
(see previous item on systems engineering), solving interfaces and possibly 
contradictory issues.
3.3.3.7 I&C systems and electrical systems
Instrumentation and control (I&C) systems and electrical systems affect the 
majority of functions of an NPP. Therefore, careful I&C architecture design and 
implementation is essential, and the tools to support a sound design are needed 
to ensure the reliability of the safety functions in different situations. Essential 
interfaces with the I&C design and control room operations have to be identified 
and included in the research in order to direct the research effort properly. Hybrid 
control rooms will be more common in the future, and the different aspects related 
to these need to be studied. Electrical systems support a variety of safety functions, 
and therefore knowledge of the effects of different disturbances – resulting from 
both external and internal sources of the plant – are important to understand, 
which seeks better protection of the plant from these kinds of faults.
3.3.3.8 SMRs
Although the main emphasis of the SAFIR2022 research is to support current 
LWRs in different phases of their life cycle, SMRs are also an attractive entity for 
overall safety research since there is relatively little historical burden (legislation, 
requirements, practices, conventions, culture) limiting novel approaches, if 
applicable. Such approaches could be applied, at least partially, to challenge the 
overall safety view of existing light water reactors, and give new insights into 
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the topic. SMRs are selected as a specific general technological area to approach 
different topics.
The rationale supporting SMRs often given is that they are safer than the current 
technology. Therefore, more information is needed to support this somewhat vague 
statement. The potential for early releases and large radioactive releases from SMRs 
should be evaluated. In addition, applying more passive systems to ensure safety 
functions and the concept of defence in depth could be the subjects of research.
To support maintaining knowledge on nuclear-specific work psychology, some 
basic research could be directed to specific aspects that may come up with SMRs. 
These new questions – for example, in control room operations – include the 
remote operation of an NPP and controlling several units from a single main control 
room.
Furthermore, although not related to SMR operations only, adaptive power 
production due to load-following demands may arise in the future, and this would 
require decision making, the flow of information and control room operations that 
are different from the full load operation that is the usual type of power operation 
currently in Finland. It should be identified what kinds of safety aspects could arise 
from these demands on control room operators, possibly affecting the optimal 
training and design of operations.
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Figure 3.3 Loviisa plant (source: Fortum).
3.4 Reactor safety
3.4.1 Description of the research area
Reactor safety research focuses on the development of experimental and 
computational research and analysis methods aimed at ensuring that a nuclear 
facility and its systems are able to implement the safety requirements set for them. 
The research questions in the area of reactor safety concentrate on the fundamental 
safety aspects and on the understanding of the behaviour of core neutronics, 
nuclear fuel, plant processes and plant systems in both normal and abnormal 
situations, including phenomena relevant to accident progression and resulting 
consequences. A basic requirement for all the activities related to reactor safety is 
the availability of sufficient expertise, analysis tools and research facilities required 
to handle the issues relevant today and in the future.
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3.4.2 Objectives of the research
The main objectives of the research area in the SAFIR2022 programme are:
• To develop and maintain a comprehensive understanding 
of matters relevant for reactor safety. This includes 
understanding of the phenomena, analysis tools and 
methods, related uncertainties and nuclear technology 
covering both the present technologies in use in Finland and 
those foreseen in the future.
• To provide sophisticated and validated tools and methods 
for safety assessments and licensing of both new units 
and modifications of existing units. The available tools and 
methods must form an entity with which authorities can 
independently assess the acceptability of the submitted 
plans and applications.
• To develop and maintain the research facilities and research 
expertise needed for the experimental work and for the 
validation of computational tools.
• To extend the use of analysis tools and facilities so that they 
can be applied to address safety concerns relevant for the 
whole life cycle of nuclear fuel and facilities, including also 
fuel transports, interim storage and final disposal.
It is expected that by the end of 2022 we will have available:
• a new validated set of analysis codes and tools that are ready 
for the applications to follow, 
• research facilities with an active role in nuclear safety work 
and with the flexibility to adapt to future research challenges,
• both new and experienced safety experts able to solve 
computational and experimental research questions, and
• a better understanding of nuclear safety.
All work in the field of reactor safety should also consider possibilities for 
international collaborations with the aim of taking advantage of the best available 
knowledge, the spread of information, focusing the national development and 
63
NATIONAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY RESEARCH 2019–2022 
SAFIR2022 FRAMEWORK PLAN
research needs to relevant areas, training new experts and increasing the utilisation 
of national research tools and facilities. One of the means to increase visibility at the 
international level is to publish as many high-quality scientific journal articles and 
conference papers as possible within the SAFIR2022 programme.
3.4.3 Research needs
3.4.3.1 General method development
A better understanding of nuclear safety as a whole requires a better understanding 
of the fundamental phenomena, processes and events. Here the roles of both 
computational and experimental research methods are emphasised and the best 
progress can be achieved when the studies performed support and complement 
each other. 
The analysis of complex multi-scale, multi-physics phenomena requires 
sophisticated computational tools and methods, covering core neutronics, thermal 
hydraulics and fuel behaviour. The calculations involve specialised codes and a 
combination of different computational models. Applying high-fidelity methods, 
such as Monte Carlo neutron transport simulation and CFD (Computational Fluid 
Dynamics) for thermal hydraulics, leads to higher accuracy, but it also dramatically 
increases computational cost. It is therefore important that traditional reduced-
order methods are developed and maintained as well. The methodology applied to 
multi-physics calculations cannot be limited to individual codes, but should cover 
the complete calculation system, including coupling algorithms and interfaces 
between different physics solvers. The use of existing codes and tools versus the 
development of new codes and tools needs to be based on careful consideration 
aimed at the optimal allocation of available resources. An example of a novel 
approach to core physics is the Kraken computational framework, which is largely 
based on the Serpent Monte Carlo code, and developed in SAFIR2018.
Reactor safety analyses deal typically with very complex phenomena and are 
based on limited and uncertain knowledge. Therefore, proper understanding and 
management of the related uncertainties is necessary for the validity and usability 
of the results. The traditional use of conservative assumptions can be justified in 
many cases, but the use of more realistic best estimate methods supplemented 
with uncertainty analyses can be better suited for certain applications and help 
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in the proper allocation of design requirements and technical solutions. A better 
understanding of the relevant uncertainties and their sources and effects is needed 
to improve the usability of the analysis results, to support the development of best 
estimate methods and to facilitate the selection of suitable analysis methods. The 
analysis of passive safety systems and features is one example where the proper 
understanding and propagation of uncertainties may be critical for the analysis 
outcome.
Probabilistic analysis methods are already widely used in many kinds of 
applications, but due to their ability to handle complex dependencies, to 
demonstrate the relative importance of items and to facilitate the management 
of uncertainties, even new application targets should be considered. Also, the 
present analysis methods and tools should be advanced further to increase the 
accuracy and speed of the analyses as well as to improve the elucidation and 
usability of the results. Possible ways of improving such aspects include further 
development of calculation algorithms, more versatile modelling of timing-related 
parameters and dependencies, including initiating event frequencies, component 
failure probabilities and the use of success criteria in event trees, and the further 
development of the use of importance measures.   
3.4.3.2 Validation of the tools
Proper validation cases are needed to support the development of the 
computational codes. The development of the validation cases should consider 
the use of both national and international research infrastructure. One important 
related activity is the development of experimental measuring technologies, which 
are needed for the acquisition of accurate and extensive measurement data. 
Validation activities should also consider the possibilities of extending the usability 
of current software tools to new application areas such as the transport and storage 
of nuclear fuel. Special cases where more work is needed include passive safety 
features, small modular reactors (SMR) and accident tolerant fuel. The possibilities 
for better use of the vast amounts of data collected at the plants could also be 
studied further. 
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3.4.3.3 Severe accidents
Analysis of severe accident phenomena as well as plant systems and strategies 
intended for severe accident management is a research area where the upkeep of 
sufficient national competence is necessary. Participation in international research 
projects concentrating on the Fukushima Daiichi accident is considered to be very 
important. For example, the mechanisms related to the containment failures at 
Fukushima Daiichi need to be understood. 
Research questions related to the timing, characterisation and spread of radioactive 
releases also possess a high safety relevance. The utilisation of passive safety features 
for severe accident management is important especially for new plant designs and 
should be studied using both computational and experimental research methods. 
Due to the considerable uncertainties associated with severe accident phenomena, 
the better combination of deterministic and probabilistic analysis tools is vital for the 
improved understanding of the risks related to nuclear operations.  
3.4.3.4 Hazards
Past experiences have shown that external hazards, including seismic events, may 
be very important contributors to nuclear safety. Therefore, even though a lot of 
research has already been carried out in this field, further research is necessary 
to maintain and improve the knowledge related to critical phenomena and their 
consequences. Of special importance, especially for new units, is the influence of 
climate change and the resulting effects on extreme situations. Also, improved 
abilities to forecast incoming extreme weather phenomena, thus providing early 
warning and time for countermeasures, could have a substantial safety relevance.
Information on external hazards is required for determining the design basis of new 
units and in the reassessment of the design basis in connection with periodic safety 
reviews. The same information on external hazards is typically required for the 
determination of the design basis and for the implementation of probabilistic risk 
assessments.
 The licensees are responsible for analysing the external hazards at nuclear power 
plant sites. In practice, the licensees often use national expert organisations as 
consultants in the analysis of external hazards. The work in the previous SAFIR 
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programmes has helped the expert organisations to develop their know-how in 
this field and this work needs to be continued in the new programme period. The 
expertise is also valuable in unexpected situations as shown by the Fukushima 
accident.
Earthquakes have to be taken into consideration in the design of nuclear facilities 
but in Finland there are no seismic requirements for conventional buildings or 
installations. Therefore, there is hardly any research on the seismic hazard in 
Finland for other purposes. The seismic hazard is regional in character and it is 
important to create and maintain sufficient national expertise in the field. Well-
known foreign consultants have an important role in supporting seismic safety in 
Finland but national efforts are required for collecting and analysing national basic 
data. Therefore, the role of the SAFIR programme is especially important regarding 
seismic hazard and seismic safety in general.
Seismic hazard research requires a consensus on estimating attenuation effects 
between the source and utility as well as monitoring needs at utilities and other 
measurements in Finland. This has been studied lately in OECD/NEA and these 
results should be available for further research. Moreover, the latest measurements 
should be studied further from the viewpoint of common design, DEC and PRA. 
Another issue is to find consensus also on other important parameters, such as 
maximum magnitude assumptions in low seismicity inner areas of continental 
slabs. One possible topic for further research is the structural mechanics modelling 
of displacements, which could give new insights into the near field effects, which 
are difficult to assess on the basis of observational data only.
Meteorological and hydrological research is conducted extensively also for other 
applications, including building regulations, land use planning and infrastructure 
protection. However, for nuclear safety, much less frequent phenomena and 
intensities are of more interest than in most other contexts. The results of general 
meteorological and hydrological research are typically not sufficient for nuclear 
safety purposes. The SAFIR projects also provide a good forum for cooperation with 
other research projects in the field. 
Since many external hazards are regional, the national expert organisations (e.g. 
Finnish Meteorological Institute, Helsinki University Institute of Seismology) have 
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an important role in collecting and analysing the measurement data. In addition 
to the statistical treatment of measured time series, the physical modelling of 
hazards should be used to assess events with very low frequencies. The SAFIR 
programme should also be used as a forum to bring together experts from different 
organisations and in creating a national understanding of the external hazards in 
Finland.
In addition to external hazards, internal hazards also have to be taken into account 
in the design of nuclear facilities. The greatest research interest in this area falls 
upon fires that may cause complex consequences for the engineered safety 
features, such as simultaneous initiating events and system unavailability, including 
system failures and spurious actuations. Best estimate methods for the modelling of 
fire spreading and fire consequences are needed for the improved understanding 
of the risks related to fires and for the design of properly dimensioned plant 
features where such risks are minimised.
Due to the wide spectrum of possible hazards and their effects, the application 
of probabilistic analysis methods is needed to support the safety assessment of 
existing and new NPP units and in the design of new safety features to make sure 
that different hazards are taken properly into account in the design specifications 
and that the resulting risk profile is well balanced.
3.4.3.5 Fuel research
Research topics relevant for future activities include the use of burn-up credit 
in criticality analysis, phenomena related to burnup uprates, the properties of 
accident tolerant fuels and the possible introduction of new burnable absorbators. 
A review of current accident acceptance criteria for fuel, especially Reactivity-
Initiated-Accident (RIA) criteria, would also be worthwhile taking into account the 
ongoing international activities such as OECD/NEA update of RIA state-of-the-art 
report and new experiments (e.g. CABRI). The research questions related to spent 
fuel behaviour during storage and transportation also provide a link to the KYT2022 
research activities. 
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Figure 3.4 Replacement of fuel at the Loviisa plant (source: Fortum).
3.4.3.6 Electric systems
Plant safety and operational systems are typically dependent on electrical power. 
Past experiences have shown that electrical disturbances, such as voltage and 
frequency variations, originating both from the external grid and from specific 
internal plant components such as the main generator, may cause complex effects 
on different plant components. The improved ability to understand and model 
the origin, propagation and effects of such disturbances can help to strengthen 
the protections and ensure the proper coordination and application of plant-level 
versus component-level protections.
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3.5 Structural safety and materials
3.5.1 Description of the research area
A prerequisite for the safe use of nuclear power plants is ensuring the durability 
of the structures, components and equipment and the reliability of the materials 
under all conditions related to the use of the plants. With respect to new plants and 
renewals related to materials, one must also be familiar with the key issues related 
to the manufacturability, manufacturing and repair technologies and inspectability 
of the components. These factors have already been addressed in earlier research 
programmes concentrating on nuclear safety, with which in-depth expertise has 
been acquired. Research programmes providing continuity have helped ensure 
the safety of our nuclear power plants that have worked reliably since the 1970s. 
In the new SAFIR2022 programme, there is a need to further increase the expertise 
in this area, producing the additional information necessary for improving the life 
cycle management of the plants and their materials taking into a consideration 
also the new processes for, for example, component manufacturing (additive 
manufacturing). A joint goal in all research is to ensure the reliability of ageing 
management throughout the plant’s life cycle. In addition, new collaboration 
models and, in particular, development of international collaboration is needed. 
The research area involves the ageing of the units. It will become a key area when 
modernising the operating nuclear power plants and building new ones. The area is 
also very broad, and therefore the research plan presents the key areas of focus for 
the new programme period. 
The research area connects structural safety and materials into a research entity 
where the aim is to benefit from expert collaboration. The goal is also to form 
a broader view of plant life cycle management. A particular goal is to secure 
the necessary knowledge and expertise to support the existing Gen II plants in 
operation and conduct method validation. The operating life of the present plants 
has been or is being extended at least by 20 years from the original planned 
lifetime. The planned operating life of new plants under construction and in design 
is 60 years. With respect to the use of new plants, a significant goal is to implement 
life cycle management programmes so that life cycle management programmes 
are already complete before the plants are commissioned. Based on experiences 
from the plants currently operating, this has been deemed important, as ageing 
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phenomena and the possibilities for managing them must be identified already 
during the design stage. Such factors include material selection, manufacturing and 
repair technologies, determination of loadings and the inspectability of structures 
and components at stages appropriate for the overall plant safety. Furthermore, 
the preconditions and assumptions made in the design of ageing management 
programmes should be understood and revised as necessary.
Operating stage factors such as the way the plant is run and plant transients play 
an important role in the long-term durability of the structures and components. 
Material and structural behaviour depends on load-follow loading. In-operation, 
monitoring information can be collected from the feedback obtained in the ageing 
management programme and through condition monitoring and inspections. 
Entities of their own in life cycle management are formed by plant modification and 
modernisations, which have systematically been implemented in Finland in order to 
ensure the operation and operating conditions of the plant compliant with modern 
requirements. In modernisation projects, ageing management procedures and the 
plant’s operating and ageing information in addition to the design principles must 
be taken into consideration in the component and structure design stage. 
Materials and components received from the decommissioned Swedish Barsebäck 
and Slovak Bohunice plants or from the existing Finnish or Swedish plants 
support ageing management and the related development. Plants that are 
decommissioned (pressure test and monitoring of the containment building to 
be dismantled in the Swedish Barsebäck plant) and decommissioned plant parts 
(steam generator replacements, pipeline renewals, reactor pressure vessel trepans, 
damage inspection) and research collaboration can yield valuable information on 
ageing phenomena. Knowledge regarding the procurement requirements and the 
operating durability of the original plant components provides important initial 
data for the renewed design. 
In this respect, the most significant development project of VTT’s research 
capacities, VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety, will create new possibilities for research.
Other structural safety and materials items are non-destructive examination 
methods, structural safety analysis and new material solutions.
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3.5.2 Objectives of the research
The research must target the material and structural solutions of the operating 
plants and those under construction, the corresponding design and load data and 
the utilisation of research capacity and know-how acquired thus far. The research 
develops the basis for the assessment of the overall safety of the plants during all 
stages of the life cycle. 
The aim of the research is to increase knowledge that supports the long-term 
and reliable use of our nuclear power plants, particularly with respect to matters 
involving the integrity of barriers or material issues that affect the reliability of the 
safety functions. The research will target the ageing phenomena of the existing 
equipment and structures and the correctly timed management of their progress. 
At the same time, attention must be paid to the utilisation of structure and 
equipment-specific ageing information, considering the design and manufacturing 
related to the replacement of out-of-date plant components. The operative 
capability of the equipment and structures in exceptional conditions must also be 
taken into account.
The research topics are ageing (metallic, concrete, polymer, water chemistry, 
automation systems), non-destructive testing (NDT, metallic and concrete), 
structural safety analysis, preparation for new technologies, new material  
solutions.
Last years’ Energiforsk research programmes have become important – for example, 
the common polymer programme. Research on reactor pressure vessel materials 
will be important in the SAFIR2022 programme.
In addition to metallic materials, polymer-based materials are used in a wide 
range of applications inside nuclear power plant containments, such as cables, 
sealants, paint coatings, lubricants and greases. An ongoing research project in 
the SAFIR2018 programme was established to provide better understanding of 
different polymer ageing, qualification and ageing management issues. The project 
concentrated on condition monitoring techniques, mapping suitable components 
for ageing studies and studying ageing mechanisms and effects inside the NPP 
containments, both experimentally and by using computational methods. 
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It is expected that by the end of 2022 we will have:   
• better knowledge that supports the long-term, safe and 
reliable use of nuclear power plants,
• non-destructive examination methods that support the safe 
and reliable use of nuclear power plants, and
• better safety analysis methods that support the safe and 
reliable use of nuclear power plants.
3.5.3 Research needs
The needs of the research programme have been divided into four topics, the 
broadest of which is ageing, which includes the knowledge and modelling of 
ageing and the failure mechanisms of components and structures in nuclear 
power plants (both physical and chemical), including assessment methods for 
the radiation tolerance of materials and the effect of radiation on long-term 
characteristics. Life cycle management methods and life cycle extension belong to 
ageing research.
Non-destructive examination and assessment methods represent a research area 
where method development is continued for the assessment of the ageing of 
equipment and structures.
A central research topic is the advanced assessment methods of structural safety. 
In addition, in experimental and computational method development, overall 
safety must be considered in addition to the safety of components and structures. 
PRA-based and deterministic design: development of the connection between 
deterministic design and PRA and the development of assessment methods at the 
interface of the methods, including the development of planning methods for risk-
informed in-service inspection programmes.
In addition, the goal of the programme is to implement projects that concentrate 
on new materials, the components and structures of new plants, and the material 
requirements and manufacturing and construction technologies of plant parts to 
be replaced or installed in the new plants.
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The goal of the broad topic entity is to produce research results through 
experimental work and computational and modelling work. Therefore, it is feasible 
to implement the research in various project types or by combining them. These 
include benchmark studies, phenomenon-based experimental research and 
modelling, the development and implementation of new research methods and 
research on representative experimental structures and real structures.
3.5.3.1 Ageing phenomena and degradation mechanisms
Ageing management, design, construction, maintenance, long-term operation 
(LTO) and microstructure-related safety research is included in this chapter. 
The design, construction, operation, condition monitoring and maintenance of 
a nuclear power plant shall provide for the ageing of systems, structures and 
components (SSCs) important to safety in order to ensure that they meet the 
design-basis requirements with the necessary safety margins throughout the 
service life of the facility. The research needs focus on metallic, concrete and 
polymer materials, water chemistry and automation systems.
Understanding the environmental effect and load in the framework of the 
behaviour and characteristics of material is a key aspect of nuclear power plant 
safety. The topic covers the change of the characteristics of ageing plant materials 
during the life cycle, the determination of the changed characteristics (mechanical 
properties, etc.), the research into plant materials and knowledge of different 
operating environments and loads.
Current topics involving the failure assessment of the components of nuclear 
power plants include reactor vessel steels whose operating life is extended and 
stainless steels as pipeline materials, including their welds and dissimilar metal 
joints. Environmental assisted damage has been studied in national nuclear safety 
programmes for a long time now. Still, cracking phenomena are not properly 
understood or explained and therefore this topic needs to be continued also in the 
forthcoming programme. Understanding the role of the environment together with 
the residual and operational stresses and strains in nucleation and the growth of 
cracks are mostly important in predicting the life cycle of components and enabling 
their safe use. 
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Ageing also affects the mechanical and chemical behaviour of many organic 
materials. For example, the fire risk of cables may change during the operating life 
of a plant. Ageing may also occur in structural fire safety components, such as fire 
stops, but the phenomena and their importance are not sufficiently well known at 
present. 
It is worth continuing the research and modelling of fracture mechanisms in 
order to ensure the durability of ageing plants and structural integrity, using more 
detailed and versatile computational analyses. 
During the programme, it is important to develop experimental and modelling 
capacity suitable for the analyses of the durability and the structural integrity of 
new plants. The scientific goals are the research of cracks of real shapes and the 
applicability of the results to real structures. 
In the assessment of radiation impact on materials, the central materials researched 
are reactor pressure vessel steels, reactor pressure vessel internals of stainless steel, 
high nickel and nickel-based alloys and fuel claddings. The goal is to determine the 
fracture-mechanical, creep and micro-structural characteristics while increasing 
the mechanistic understanding. With respect to reactor pressure vessel steel, 
conventional steels should be addressed along with the new type of Russian steel, 
and the impact of new and old manufacturing methods on the usability of the 
materials should be studied. New research needs and challenges are also present in 
the field of radiation tolerance of non-metallic materials, such as concrete structures 
and cable materials. In this field, it would be useful to carry out international 
collaboration for increasing new information and expertise. 
Fuel cladding materials are a group of materials on their own whose research 
cannot be detached from fuel research. The cladding materials and fuels have 
developed significantly owing to the suppliers’ work and use experience. This has 
also enabled the increase of burn-up limits implemented in Finland in recent years 
for the current power plants. A current research topic is the experimental research 
into cladding material behaviour in research reactor conditions. 
An important research challenge in the field is the cumulative effect of ageing 
phenomena. In real plant environments, failures are rarely the consequence 
75
NATIONAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY RESEARCH 2019–2022 
SAFIR2022 FRAMEWORK PLAN
of a single phenomenon. Fatigue assessment may require observation of both 
mechanical and acoustic vibrations. The cumulative effect of different failure 
mechanisms, such as creep and fatigue, or corrosion and fatigue, cannot be 
assessed through individual failure mechanisms; their synergistic interactions must 
be determined as well. 
International databases shall be used where possible to identify detailed research 
needs in Finland. Microstructure research will concentrate on more specific items, 
the balance between research and practical items shall be achieved.
Metallic
The ageing of metallic structures occurs when chemical, thermal or mechanical 
loading or neutron radiation causes changes in structure properties resulting in 
changes in most loaded areas, typically in welds where residual stress causes high-
level preloading. A systematic approach in ageing management may lead to a large 
number of ageing mechanisms. The problem is that the real mechanical, thermal 
and chemical loading as well as transients of the structure are not known. In any case 
of ageing-based failure, there is one or more triggering mechanism. Representative 
usage of data as close as possible to the actual environment is the only fact that has 
use in finding the right mechanism and risk components to investigate.
Generally, the goal is to create experimental research methods for phenomena 
recognised as special questions in Finland, gathering new experimental data and 
developing engineering methods for managing phenomena leading to failure. 
Structural safety is largely based on understanding ageing phenomena and 
structural integrity. Unforeseeable research needs can be expected to emerge 
during the construction of the new units. Relicensing of existing plants and the 
extension of their lifetimes from the original licences for operation will focus the 
research on ageing phenomena during the long-term operation of the plant, As 
the estimated lifetime of new plants is 60 years and the decision and construction 
licence applications are made for additional capacity, the research needs of new 
plants will be an important part of the research area. 
Structural integrity is based on recognising degradation mechanisms, finding the 
possible failures and determining their size, and assessing the rate of crack growth 
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and propagation. It is essential to understand the failure susceptibility of different 
structural materials and components, as well as the impact of manufacturing 
techniques on failure sensitivity. In addition, the environmental conditions and 
structural loads have to be known. Research projects on metallic materials may 
include the embrittlement of reactor pressure vessel materials, the embrittlement 
of austenitic stainless steels of reactor internals, the structural integrity of pressure 
bearing components other than the reactor pressure vessel, the structural integrity 
of dissimilar metal welds, etc. Important degradation phenomena to be studied 
in addition to embrittlement are stress corrosion cracking, SCC (stainless steels 
and nickel-based materials), fatigue, including environmentally assisted fatigue, 
oxidation and other corrosion phenomena. The risk induced by a degraded system 
is taken into account by the PRA-analysis. The ageing assessment is then done by 
either a deterministic or partly or fully probabilistic risk matrix. Furthermore, the 
possibilities of preventing or mitigating degradation are handled in sections such 
as mitigation, inspection and monitoring.
Concrete
With respect to the load bearing function of the inner containment concrete wall 
and the leak tightness function of the liner, the leading ageing mechanisms are 
creep and shrinkage of the concrete in connection with the relaxation of the pre-
stressing steel.
The creep and shrinkage of the concrete together with the relaxation of the pre-
stressing steel lead to a decrease of the pre-stressing force and a decrease of the 
concrete compression stress. If this time-dependent process would last for an 
unlimited time, it would finally cause tensile stresses and cracks in the concrete 
under certain design load conditions.
Other important ageing mechanisms include steel and concrete steel reinforcement 
corrosion and chemical attack against concrete structures (concrete, reinforcement, 
steel liners, etc.). It has also been observed that corrosion and serious cracking have 
also been caused by formwork clamps made of aluminium and left in the structure. 
Corrosion attack due to sea water on steel reinforcements is possible in various 
parts of the cooling water structures and other reinforced concrete structures 
exposed to sea water, if cathodic protection has not been installed.  
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Concrete degradation becomes one of the main issues for the long-term 
operation of an NPP. Concrete degradation mechanisms (e.g. alkali-silica reaction, 
delayed ettringite formation, sulphate attack, reinforcement steel corrosion, 
freeze/thaw cycles, irradiated concrete, among others) have been detected in 
concrete nuclear facilities and have been linked to the loss of performance and 
the residual lifetime. 
In this regard, one of the biggest challenges in dealing with ageing/deteriorating 
concrete structures is identifying the cause of possible distress, to establish the 
correlation between the modification in the mechanical/physical properties and 
the chemical reaction behind, to define the structural ultimate limit state (physical 
integrity) and serviceability limit state (structural performance and durability), 
to evaluate possible implications of the degradation and also their potential for 
further deterioration. 
Special attention should be given to deleterious expansive reactions, which include 
alkali silica reactions (ASR) and delayed ettringite formation (DEF). ASR and DEF 
have recently become a top R&D priority for US NRC, CNRC, IRSN, EdF and FANC. 
Several international technical groups (RILEM and FIB) have begun to address these 
issues.
The casting of a massive safety classified concrete structure is a challenge. 
Hydration of cement induces high temperatures and temperature differences 
between the core and surface of the structures. The temperature can be measured 
during casting and drying, but simulation beforehand should be possible. Concrete 
structures have many kinds of requirements, such as the water tightness of the 
pools, but often there is a lack of acceptance criteria.     
The ageing of concrete structures depends on the conditions to which the 
structure is exposed. The conditions can be monitored and structures inspected. 
Also, PRA analysis is a tool for determining partly or fully the probabilistic risk 
matrix. Research would be needed when actions have to be taken for various NPP 
reinforced concrete structures suffering from steel reinforcement corrosion and 
how renovations should be carried out.
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Polymer
When it comes to ageing, the most critical applications of polymer materials in 
electrical and instrumentation/control (I&C) components are usually electrical 
insulation and sealant structures. Therefor the ageing of polymer materials is 
an important aspect for the safe and reliable operation of electrical and I&C 
components. The normal way of taking the effects of polymer ageing into account 
in the qualification of electrical and I&C components is type testing including 
artificial ageing treatments representing the ageing stressors of the intended 
design environment. Temperature and radiation are normally considered the 
most significant environmental factors causing the ageing of electrical and I&C 
equipment in the nuclear power plant environment, but depending on the 
application and the type of equipment, humidity, vibration and voltage can 
also have an effect on the ageing of polymer materials. In addition, the ageing 
atmosphere (e.g. nitrogen in some BWR containments) affects the ageing 
mechanisms, and exposure to several environmental stressors simultaneously can 
have significant effect on the resulting ageing degradation of polymer materials. 
High temperature has been identified as the most common stressor causing 
ageing, but also the effects of the other stressors need to be covered by the artificial 
ageing treatments in the type testing phase of the qualification. When arranging 
the ageing treatments, a typical practical problem is taking into account the 
combined effect of several stressors, because, for example, simultaneous irradiation 
and thermal ageing is usually difficult to arrange. Another aspect regarding 
arranging artificial ageing treatments is acceleration factors (e.g. thermal ageing 
time compared to the lifetime for which the equipment is being qualified for or 
the irradiation dose rate compared to the dose rates during normal operation or 
accident conditions). 
The combined effects of the different ageing stressors and the effects of 
acceleration factors of artificial ageing have been studied for decades, but 
general formulas or equations and rules ready for practical applications have not 
been established. This kind of knowledge would be very useful as the basis of 
qualification testing.
Another issue regarding the ageing of polymer materials is the vast number 
of different compounds and detailed formulations available on the markets. 
In addition, the detailed formulations are not usually commonly available. It is 
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known that even if the basic polymer remains the same – for example, due to 
different additives – the ageing behaviour of the polymer material might change 
significantly. This further complicates the qualified lifetime management and 
traceability of polymer materials. It would be highly beneficial to have the means 
of determining the effects of change of, say, a certain additive, on the ageing 
behaviour without the need for repeating the entire, time-consuming type test 
programme including the artificial ageing treatments. In addition, a relatively 
simple test method for verifying that certain polymer compound matches the 
qualified one would have a lot of practical applications.
As for ageing management and the condition monitoring of electrical and I&C 
components installed in nuclear power plants, non-destructive field test methods 
are considered as having the best practical importance. One interesting aspect of 
ageing management is using the concept of qualified condition instead of qualified 
lifetime, which means that in type testing of a component, during (or at least after) 
the artificial ageing treatment, before the possible accident or design basis event 
tests, a certain condition indicator representing the ageing deterioration of the 
component/materials is measured, and during the operation of the component at 
the plant the same condition indicator is measured at certain intervals to verify that 
the ageing status remains above the qualified condition. Investigating the reliability 
of different condition indicators for qualified condition with a relatively simple 
component (e.g. a cable) in practice could provide some useful information for 
ageing management in general.
Another R&D area is the ageing of coatings. EPDM (ethylene propylene diene 
monomer) coatings have been used, for example, in pool structures.  
Water chemistry
In terms of ageing management, the main tasks of water chemistry are to monitor 
and manage chemical conditions in the process. 
The chemical programmes cover the primary and secondary circuits of the old 
and new nuclear power plants, intermediate circuits, component cooling circuits, 
generator water-cooled circuit and other auxiliary systems related to the previous 
ones. Chemistry programmes affect all those devices and components that are in 
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contact with the process medium. Water chemistry issues are linked to materials’ 
performance as a whole because the water chemistry of the system impacts also on 
the corrosion of materials. Corrosion in turn plays an important part in, for example, 
the initiation of cracks and the formation of corrosion products. 
One of the topics in the area is the activation build-up on the primary circuit 
surfaces and the effect of the water chemistry regime and different surface 
conditions in existing and new plants. Regarding new plants, the passivation 
procedure of primary circuit surfaces during the Hot Functional Testing (HFT) 
period is of high importance in reducing the activity build-up during the following 
operational periods. Therefore, the optimisation of the procedures and water 
chemistry regime used during HFT is an important research area. Most of the 
activity within the primary circuit of both BWRs and PWRs resides within the 
crud (deposit forming on the fuel cladding). The release of activity from crud into 
the primary coolant (and further deposition on other primary circuit surfaces) is 
aggravated by operational transients (including start-up and shutdown periods). 
Water chemistry regimes minimising crud formation during the operational periods 
and reduction of activity release and impurity enrichment during transients forms 
another research area relevant to reducing activity build-up. 
Impurities and their enrichment in areas of restricted flow form a threat to the 
integrity of pressure boundaries of both BWRs and PWRs. In the secondary side 
of PWRs, stress corrosion cracking (SCC) caused by enrichment of impurities 
due to boiling continues to be the main cause of failure of steam generators. In 
BWRs, for example, chloride and sulphate transients are suspected of enhancing 
stress corrosion cracking in, for example, dissimilar welds and pressure vessel 
steel under cladding. Research work aimed at understanding the mechanisms of 
impurity enrichment and developing models for the phenomena is internationally 
recognised as a relevant area.
Hydrazine (N2H4) is commonly used in PWRs as an oxygen scavenging agent, both 
in the primary circuit during start-up and in the secondary circuit during operation 
and shut-down periods. However, hydrazine use is becoming more restricted and 
can even become forbidden due to its toxicity. Alternative water chemistry regimes 
replacing hydrazine in PWRs are actively sought out and form another possible 
research topic. 
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Small and medium size reactors (SMR) are currently being developed worldwide. 
The water chemistry of these reactors has not been decided, and may differ 
markedly from current operating reactors. This is an area foreseen as a research item 
that needs to be at least followed carefully. 
Automation systems
Research has been carried out on the ageing of relay components. Traditional 
technology usually relies on primary evidence based on experiments made through 
testing, inspections and mechanical sampling. An interesting research topic is the 
ageing of the polymer parts of these components (see polymer materials research 
above) in addition to the metallic parts and components in relevant environmental 
conditions. It would be useful to know the ageing and type testing conditions also 
for the new parts that will replace the older aged ones. New digital automation has 
different ageing phenomena, technology ageing.
Design and ageing management
Design and ageing management of at least new materials and structures in 
mechanical and civil engineering should be identified and supported by research. 
A better understanding is needed between traditional design criteria with 
corresponding design margins and design extension conditions (DEC) with a safety 
and security interface. Corresponding supportive research in line with internal and 
external hazards and events is needed.
3.5.3.2 Non-destructive examination and assessment methods
The importance of developing non-destructive examination methods (NDE) was 
highlighted in the assessment of the SAFIR2018 research programme. Research 
areas for metallic structures include, among others, the study of the inspectability 
of fatigue fractures with NDT methods and, in particular, the verification of the 
reliability and detection probability of the related observations and the creation of 
probability or detection (POD) graphs. A new topic where NUGENIA collaboration is 
possible would be the research on magnetite accumulation in the steam generator, 
which, as a topic, is closely related to the research of the effect of water chemistry in 
the steam generator. In addition, POD modelling should be developed for complex 
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objects, such as reactor pressure vessel assembly and dissimilar metal joints. One of 
the goals for the metallic NDE is standardisation.   
The goal in the programme is also to apply NDE technologies to concrete structures 
with a reliability that corresponds to that attained with metal structures. Although 
concrete as a porous material and implemented reinforcement as compound 
materials constitute a diversified research object, the NDE methods applied there 
are principally the same as with metal structures. For example, research needs 
include the reliability of results obtained with NDT methods on concrete structures 
and the suitability of different methods for the life cycle management of nuclear 
power plant structures. In concrete research, there is a connection to the National 
Research Programme on Nuclear Waste Management (KYT) where the long-term 
characteristics of concrete are researched experimentally under final disposal 
conditions.
NPP concrete structures are exposed to physical, chemical, and mechanical factors 
that can cause deterioration. Poor construction and deterioration can result in the 
loss of strength and the unsafe conditions of the structures. To ensure the safety 
and integrity of NPP, non-destructive testing (NDT) is carried out during the in-
service lifetime. However, current NDT faces several challenges: the accuracy of 
the test devices, the compatibility of different NDT methods with the concrete 
structures and their deterioration mechanisms, the global uniformity of the NDT 
test methods and creditability of the test results and analysis. As a result of NDE 
tests for reinforced concrete structures, the following are of interest: the level of 
reinforcement corrosion and recognising and localising voids behind liner plates, 
such as in pools and tendon cable ducts. It is of interest to know the severity of 
reinforcement corrosion and when it is necessary to take remedial actions.
Research on non-destructive test methods of polymer materials is also considered 
important. It could provide new information on ageing of, for example, electrical 
and I/C components in nuclear power plants.
3.5.3.3 Structural safety analysis and preparation for new technologies
In line with the SAFIR2018 programme, the areas of focus in computational 
assessment of structural integrity are various plant transient situations and the 
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development of structural analysis methods, and determining the loads caused 
by various process situations in a more realistic way. Examples of these are 
thermal stress and heat stress in fluid-structure interaction analyses, and realistic 
assessment of residual welding stress, also considering the load and effect of 
operating time. In the future, instructions must also be given for the commonly 
acceptable usages of the related complex software, and for calculation methods 
in general. Event information databases should be developed and maintained for 
calculation, as they would enable the statistical processing of the phenomena in 
the plant’s life cycle management. 
Determining the fracture-mechanical parameters of radiated material based 
on experiments involves continuous development of the calculation methods. 
The established examinations based on the Master curve concept and their 
development will also retain their central role in the future. The development 
of numerical analysis methods requires more accurate material characterisation 
methods as well, and this means that experimental research must continue. 
At present, the safety classified concrete structures of nuclear power plants, 
particularly the containment building, are designed to withstand considerable 
unexpected loads. Ensuring the load tolerance requires reliable specifications of 
the structure’s integrity. For containment buildings, the most important methods 
are stress, deformation, temperature and humidity measurements using fixed 
and temporary measurement devices. In this respect, it is important to follow the 
development of international standards in the field, which, at the moment, does 
not include how probabilistic structural calculations have to be performed.
The SAFIR2018 programme has covered experimental impact tests on reinforced 
concrete slabs for assessing the bending and perforation of a straight wall. In 
addition, computational methods have been developed and validated. Dedicated 
impact tests will be carried out. The development of modelling methods and 
techniques for impact loaded structures will continue. Numerical methods will be 
validated using experimental data and benchmark studies.
Vibration phenomena affecting design and ageing management need to be 
understood better. The source of vibration can be internal from the plant process, 
including acoustic vibrations, and external, from an earthquake or airplane crash. 
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Qualification against vibrations is challenging and require competent people within 
research, design and the operation of utilities.
The dimensioning of structural fire safety is based on assumptions concerning 
fire development, performance measured under standardised conditions and the 
performance requirements set by plant solutions. There are computational methods 
for the functional dimensioning of structural fire safety, but the dimensioning 
adheres to a tradition that dates back decades. The modelling and simulation 
methods should be developed so that the behaviour of real structures and their 
components during different kinds of fires can be assessed computationally. 
The methods should be such that they can be combined with probabilistic fire 
simulations in order to create a design PRA connection. Also defence in depth of 
fire protection should be acknowledged in order to ensure the clear design and 
PRA against the spread of fire.
More interaction with other research areas of the SAFIR2022 programme should 
be created in the field of structural integrity, such as the assessment of the safety 
significance of phenomena and structures with respect to overall plant safety. In 
addition, the utilisation of international research programmes should be improved. 
New construction methods and methodologies will be followed: steel-concrete 
structures, modular construction, the assessment of various regulations and 
standards in nuclear power plant structures, probabilistic structural analysis and 
design needs and more broad-scale utilisation of experimental equipment.
The following research topics have been recognized items that could possibly 
provide useful information:
FEM coupling for structural analysis:
• combination of fluid dynamic analysis with structural 
response analysis
• combination of temperature conductivity/radiation analysis 
with structural response analysis
• PSA level 2 analysis
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Traditional tools for conservative safety analyses + high-fidelity tools for best-
estimate analyses:
• development of validated procedure
• methodology for design and design extension conditions 
analysis
• (material, structures, loads and load combinations taken 
account phase differences and frequency of occurrence)
Typical structural analysis, if any:
• Core catcher 
• IVR (In Vessel Retention)
• Containment tightness also PRA level 2 point of view
• Vibration analysis of structures, pipelines and HVAC channels, 
including acoustic vibration
External hazards, structural response and equipment qualification
• PSA level 2 analysis, containment
• Seismic analysis
• APC 
• Explosion analysis
Ageing management spent fuel pool from PRA level 2 point of view
Preparation for new technologies (SMR, etc.).
3.5.3.4 New material solutions
Additive manufacturing
Although the nuclear industry has very high quality and certificate requirements, it 
has recognised the potential benefits of additive manufacturing (3D printing) and 
work is ongoing to expand the standard procedures and to deepen understanding 
of material-process-property relationships including irradiation performance. 
Additive manufacturing is still in its very early stage of development with regard to 
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the characterisation of mechanical properties and qualification practices starting 
from the qualification of components. Much work is needed before additive 
manufacturing can be used in the manufacture of NPP components – the final 
objective being the introduction of additive manufacturing in nuclear design 
codes. It has been recognised that both additive manufacturing and Hot Isostatic 
Pressing methods are both essentially powder metallurgical, near net shape 
manufacturing processes, which have differences but also some common features. 
Research on these evolving technologies is needed to pursue the manufacture of 
NPP components in the future.
 The implementation and licensing of future plant projects or replacing new 
components may cause a research need concerning new materials and structural 
solutions and new production techniques. Possible new manufacturing 
technologies or new materials (e.g. stellite replacing materials, nickel-based alloys, 
nitrogen alloyed austenitic stainless steel) may become important areas of study. 
Changes in manufacturing techniques and in structural design are also a challenge 
for component lifetime management.
Figure 3.5 Annual maintenance at the Olkiluoto plant (source: TVO).
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3.6 Research infrastructure development
3.6.1 Finnish nuclear safety infrastructure in the global network and 
market
The safety assessment of nuclear power plants requires deep knowledge 
concerning the physical processes taking place inside the plant systems, 
structures and components. Such knowledge ultimately rests on representative 
experimentation and physical modelling, which allows the development, 
verification and validation of computational tools for safety assessment. A similar 
understanding is also needed for the assessment of operational safety and plant 
ageing. Moreover, decades of experience demonstrates that novel safety issues 
may emerge, often as a consequence of phenomena originally misunderstood, or 
forgotten over time. Examples of such major events include the Barsebäck ECCS 
strainer issue in 1992, Davis Besse hole-in-the-head in early 2000, the Paks fuel 
damage incident in 2004, the Forsmark emergency power supply failure in 2006, 
and the Fukushima meltdowns in 2011. 
Therefore, there is a need for up-to-date research capabilities that can satisfy 
the needs of both existing and future power plants and other nuclear facilities. 
In addition to infrastructure related directly to the safe use of nuclear power 
plants, research capabilities that support the ageing management of the plants, 
interim storage and final disposal of used fuel are also important (interfacing with 
KYT2022). 
When the research on the power plants in operation or under construction is 
combined with their long service life and the subsequent decommissioning 
period, as well as the final disposal of fuel, the time span for research infrastructure 
after commissioning a new plant is at least 100 years. On the basis of operating 
experience, including the Fukushima accident, safety functions must be developed 
further and preparations made for rare initiating events and combinations 
of events, as well as for emerging (or re-emerging) safety issues. To meet this 
requirement, Finland must possess sufficient infrastructural preparedness for 
its own experimental and computational activity. Domestic infrastructure and 
experimental research is vital for the maintenance and enhancement of national 
competencies. Moreover, it can be used to leverage international experimental 
capabilities for Finnish needs,
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The strong development phase in SAFIR research started with the development 
of the VTT research capabilities realising the VTT Centre for Nuclear safety, thus 
concentrating in VTT and the Otaniemi area. The next phase is to continue the 
development of the LUT facilities in Lappeenranta. Further, there is a need to 
develop the areas that can be common for SAFIR and KYT research, thus preparing 
the way for the combined programme from 2023.
3.6.2 The VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety
The VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety and its new hot cell facilities was constructed 
and licensed for operation over the period from 2013 to 2018. With full licensing 
achieved in 2018, the new facility will transition to full research and testing 
operations over the SAFIR 2022 period. During this period it is important to 
continue to adapt the equipment and develop the handling processes and tools for 
executing particular research activities presented by the needs of topical research 
projects. Support of the infrastructure development in this manner is important for 
establishing a portfolio of means for executing the nuclear safety research activities, 
enabling those research projects to focus on their core scientific goals, rather than 
on the practicalities of adapting the infrastructure to their technical needs.
At the same time, the decommissioning of the old research reactor and radiological 
facilities has transitioned from clean-up and removal of equipment and legacy waste, 
to the more serious work of decontamination and dismantling. The confluence of 
these two research infrastructure processes has revealed the importance of having 
long-term waste handling strategies, and planning for decommissioning already in 
the commissioning phase. The importance of such recognition is also relevant in the 
context of converging the SAFIR and KYT research programmes.
As a brand new, clean and modern facility, the VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety should 
utilise this historical infrastructure renewal opportunity to develop the devices and 
processes necessary to minimise the operational and decommissioning waste already 
from the outset. Even if nation-level negotiations are underway to secure a long-
term disposal solution for decommissioning waste from the FiR1 test reactor and old 
radiological facilities, it is in all stakeholders’ interest that the ultimate volume of future 
waste is minimised to as little as is reasonably achievable. The means for minimising 
the accumulation of contamination in the first place, effectively decontaminating in 
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the second place, and reducing the volume of radioactive waste in the third place 
are all steps that can bring benefits not only to the operations of the new facility 
but also to the decommissioning of the old facilities, and perhaps even to the future 
decommissioning of NPPs. A thorough waste handling programme is also an essential 
component for enabling collaborative opportunities nationally between VTT and 
universities, and particularly across national borders where trans-shipment of anything 
that could be interpreted as radioactive waste is strongly frowned upon, and often 
prohibited by legislation. Finally, in addition to effectively managing the waste stream, 
it is important to establish the other means for ensuring the safe utilisation of the 
facilities beyond VTT; first, within Finland through access by universities, and second, 
internationally through active participation in research infrastructure networks that 
promote access by externals. On the European level, enabling access is also strongly 
promoted, particularly within the cost-heavy nuclear research infrastructures, and it is 
essential for the Jules Horowitz Reactor becoming operational for irradiating and then 
characterising test materials in a collaborative manner.
The construction of VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety, which has new hot cell facilities 
and other facilities and equipment needed for research on nuclear technology 
materials, commenced in 2013. Radiological commissioning of the facility was 
completed in 2017, and the ramp-up of the hot cell utilization is still ongoing. The 
research to be carried out at the centre is on GEN II– IV reactors, fusion energy and 
nuclear waste management. The existence of shared facilities and equipment will 
promote the synergy of Finnish research on existing and future reactor concepts. 
Another topical issue is the utilisation of the decommissioned Barsebäck reactor in 
Sweden for international research projects before it is dismantled in 2020.
It is expected that by the end of 2022 we will have:
• A fully operating Centre for Nuclear Safety radiological 
facility and hot cell providing a diverse array of services for all 
national stakeholders, with a minimal waste stream. 
• Capacity that is effectively utilised through access 
agreements with domestic universities and selected 
international partnerships.
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3.6.3 Thermal hydraulic facilities at LUT
Domestic capability to build, run and operate thermal hydraulic test facilities is 
essential for gaining a better understanding of the processes in nuclear power 
plants in all phases of a plant’s lifetime. In the design and licensing phases, the 
performance of new technologies (novel safety system designs, core catchers, etc.) 
needs to be independently verified. In addition, the resolution of emerging safety 
issues (Barsebäck, Davis-Besse, Paks, Fukushima) requires facilities, devices and 
testing procedures that can be developed only by professional skilled staff. Ageing 
processes and operational loads of the plant systems have to be known to allow the 
long-term operation of the plants (licence renewals). Generally, for understanding 
the phenomena and processes already known, and especially those that are 
previously unforeseen, there has to be an environment that enables studies on 
these processes also experimentally. 
New and advanced measuring techniques allow for more detailed and accurate 
data to be collected from the test configurations also in 3D geometries. In addition 
to gaining experience and understanding the phenomena in the processes from 
the tests, the data supports the safety analysis code development and validation, 
also for CFD analyses.
The LUT thermal hydraulic testing infrastructure and the operating staff aim to be 
capable of constructing, instrumenting and operating representative models of 
all phenomena of interest to stakeholders (mainly the power companies and the 
regulator). Upgrading the research infrastructure of nuclear engineering at LUT 
began in 2016, with the first steps of the current infrastructure being funded by the 
Academy of Finland. In the NextGenTH project (2016–2018) a vision of a flexible 
thermal hydraulic research environment has been presented and the basic operating 
parameters have been decided together with stakeholders. The flexibility is based on 
modularity and the innovative use of the components (modules) such as pressure 
vessels, heating modules, heat exchangers, etc. The first configuration of this research 
environment (MOTEL) will be a model of a SMR (Small Modular Reactor).
A project proposal for the continuation of the FIRI project has been submitted to 
the Academy of Finland. The proposal aims to supplement MOTEL with further 
interchangeable modules to represent either an SMR containment or a PWR. The 
funding period in the application is for 2019–2021.
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Thermal hydraulic infrastructure relies on the instrumentation, knowledge of using 
it as per the instrument design, but also finding innovative and new ways of using 
measuring devices. The measurement techniques to be introduced include optical 
fibre-based temperature or strain profile determination, and expanding the use 
techniques already explored in SAFIR2018, namely Wire Mesh Sensing and Particle 
Imaging Velocimetry, both of which have already shown great promise and proven 
their usefulness.
High-performance calculation servers suitable for high-fidelity CFD analyses form 
an important part of the thermal hydraulic infrastructure at LUT. They are utilised 
both to the qualification and validation of the CFD models against data obtained 
from experiments and to the actual design of experiments.
Innovative development must be continued in areas considered important in 
order for Finland to retain the capacity to carry out experiments regarding the 
thermal and flow technology of nuclear reactors even when they concern new and 
unexpected phenomena.
It is expected that by the end of 2022 we will have:
• a research environment capable of studying experimentally 
and numerically any thermal hydraulic problem that may 
arise in the nuclear power plants in Finland, or candidate 
plants considered by the Finnish stakeholders;
• the capability to design, construct and operate thermal-
hydraulic test facilities and associated measuring systems;
• two alternative MOTEL configurations (MOTEL SMR and 
MOTEL TBD);
• separate-effects test sections for topics of current interest, 
such as ageing related studies or sump/strainer performance 
assessment, run either as part of MOTEL or independently;
• state-of-the-art measuring techniques available for data 
collection and visualisation – pointwise, 1D-, 2D-, 3D-field 
mapping, high-speed photography.
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3.6.4 Jules Horowitz Materials Testing Reactor
In the future, the forthcoming Jules Horowitz materials testing reactor will be one 
part of the Finnish nuclear infrastructure, even though it is located in France. The 
construction of the JHR will be finalised during the SAFIR20122 programme period 
(first criticality in 2022) and in parallel with that the start of the operational phase 
and the first experimental programmes will be planned by the international JHR 
consortium. The JHR Governing Board nominated three working groups (Fuel, 
Materials and Technology WGs) to collect together the scientific topics already 
in 2012. Since then, these WGs have been planning the first programme already 
for the pre-JHR era. Currently, the plan is for the pre-JHR fuel studies to be carried 
out in connection with the OECD/NEA, and the first material programme in the 
H2020/EURATOM project in connection with the European Nuclear Education 
Network (ENEN). In the fuel programme, the target will be in “Quantifying clad 
thermomechanical load mechanisms during LWR transients”, whereas in the 
material programme the main focus will be in “Standardization/harmonization 
of facility usage and best practices concerning mechanical testing of irradiated 
materials and microstructural characterizations”. Even though being “modest” 
programmes, the starting and organisation of the internal JHR consortium co-
operation is very important at this stage in order to get prepared for the actual 
reactor programmes starting in 2023 and later.
In Finland so far, participation in the JHR WGs has been mainly VTT’s and partly 
Fortum’s responsibility. However, in the future, and already during the SAFIR2022 
programme, operation planning needs to involve the entire Finnish consortium 
that owns the share of the JHR experimental capacity. The natural home base for 
the JHR operation phase is the SAFIR2022 programme and other programmes after 
it. Therefore, in the planning of the projects for this programme the possibilities for 
co-operation with the JHR community should be taken into consideration as well.
It is expected that by the end of 2022 we will have:
• The Finnish in kind construction project producing real 
equipment to the JHR reactor is finished and the first pre-JHR 
experimental programmes are running for fuel and material 
studies.  
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• Finnish participation via the SAFIR2022 programme is active. 
• In parallel, the planning of the first actual JHR experimental 
programme is on-going and even finished before 2022. 
• The Finnish nuclear community participates in the “JHR 
School” by having younger experts as students and getting 
networked there. ‘
• The co-operation between VTT CNS and the JHR has been 
established via the programmes.
3.6.5 Other national infrastructures
The Reactor Materials Research Group began in the early 1970s under KTM (≈ 
currently the MEAE) but was soon organised to VTT Metals Laboratory, which 
became a major international player in the field of NPP pressure boundary material 
performance and reliability in realistic conditions. Today, the experimental facilities 
are located in the CNS and the underground Research Hall 1. The CNS is dedicated 
to studying reactor internals, RPV and other active materials. However, a major part 
of the experimental research on fracture, fatigue, corrosion, wear and other ageing 
phenomena related to NPP primary and secondary side structures and facilities 
used in the qualification of different polymeric components are currently located 
in Research Hall 1. This research infrastructure has grown an internationally rare 
infrastructure for multi-disciplinary materials and components research, including 
also the inspection and long-term safety of materials and concepts used for spent 
fuel disposal. 
Currently, the VTT Impact test facility is unique in the world. The current project 
partners have expressed a need for more realistic tests. In order to study the 
dynamic behaviour of reinforced concrete structures that are more close to real 
life scenarios (airplane crashes into NPPs) the capacity of the existing test facility 
needs to be updated. In particular, the missile mass and velocity needs to increase 
and larger and more realistic target structures need to be implemented. As far as 
knowledge transfer is concerned, maintaining sufficient know-how is a key issue in 
utilising the VTT Impact test facility.
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It is expected that by the end of 2022 we will have:
• An upgraded impact test facility in use and it enables 
experiments that are very close to the real life scenarios, such 
as containment wall perforation by an aircraft engine shaft.
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4 Summary
The safe use of nuclear power requires national expertise based on high-quality 
scientific research. Chapter 7a of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act, which came into 
force in 2004, sets the objective of national nuclear safety research: to ensure 
that if new matters related to the safe use of nuclear power plants should arise, 
the authorities possess sufficient technical expertise and other competence for 
determining the significance of those matters without delay. The aim of the nuclear 
safety programme planned for 2019–2022, under the name SAFIR2022, is to ensure 
expertise particularly in topics where no research would otherwise take place in 
Finland.
The programme is funded by the Finnish State Nuclear Waste Management Fund 
(VYR), as well as other key organisations operating in the area of nuclear energy. 
The annual funding of the SAFIR2018 programme has been in the order of EUR 10 
million annually. In the new programme, the goal is to keep Finnish funding at the 
same level or increase it slightly.
Several licensing and safety evaluation projects will take place during the 
SAFIR2022 programme period: Olkiluoto 3’s operating licence, Fennovoima’s 
construction licence for Hanhikivi 1, periodic safety reviews of Loviisa 1 and 2. 
Significant modernisation projects will be carried out for Loviisa 1 and 2 as well 
as the Olkiluoto 1 and 2 plant units. The SAFIR2022 programme works as an 
environment that provides nuclear safety researchers with a possibility for in-depth 
training in the research projects and that also facilitates the training of young new 
experts.
The significance of a high scientific level of national research is emphasised as 
activities become more international. The SAFIR2022 programme is an important 
channel for international co-operation. Experimental environments are particularly 
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expensive and, despite significant Finnish investment in the past and coming 
years, participation in international development projects and the utilisation of 
international infrastructure are necessary in order to maintain the high quality of 
national activities.
The research content and procedures of SAFIR2022 have taken into account the 
international assessment of the SAFIR2018 research programme ordered by the 
MEAE and implemented during the spring 2018 [3]. The recommendations of the 
research strategy for the nuclear power sector [5] and the report of the national 
competence workgroup on the nuclear energy field [4] were already taken into 
account in the planning of SAFIR2018. The competence survey reported in [4] was 
updated for 2017 situation in the SAFIR2018 administration project.
The administrative structure of SAFIR2022 follows that of SAFIR2018. The goal 
of the structure in SAFIR2018 was to improve administrative work efficiency and 
reduce it in projects and groups steering the projects. The SAFIR2022 programme’s 
operating model consists of a Management Board and four research area steering 
groups working under it. Each project is associated with a reference group that 
concentrates on scientific and technological guidance.
The research planned for the SAFIR2022 programme has been grouped into four 
research areas: (1) Overall safety and a systemic approach to safety, (2) Reactor 
safety, (3) Structural safety and materials, and (4) Research infrastructure.
Overall safety and systemic approach to safety collects a wide range of nuclear 
safety research areas that overarch between several topics, as well as topics 
affecting the nuclear power plant as a whole. Such topics include the concept 
of overall safety itself, organisational issues, automation architecture, control 
room design and operations, human factors, external hazards, safety and security 
interfaces, electrical systems, setting the safety requirements, and controlling the 
plant design throughout its lifetime.
Reactor safety research focuses on the development of experimental and 
computational methods aimed at ensuring that a nuclear facility and its systems 
are able to implement the safety requirements set for them. The research questions 
focus on the fundamental safety aspects and on an understanding of the behaviour 
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of nuclear fuel, plant processes and plant systems in both normal and abnormal 
situations, including phenomena relevant to accident progression and the resulting 
consequences. In addition to general method development for complex multi-
physics phenomena, the tools need to be validated and the uncertainties managed. 
Important topics are also severe accident analysis and management, internal and 
external hazards, including the fire risks analysis and phenomena related to the 
climate change and fuel research.
The aim of the research on structural safety and materials is to increase knowledge 
that supports the long-term and reliable use of our nuclear power plants, 
particularly with respect to matters involving the integrity of barriers or material 
issues that affect the reliability of the safety functions. The research will target the 
ageing phenomena of the existing devices and structures and the correctly timed 
management of their progress. Attention should also be paid to the utilisation of 
structure- and device-specific ageing information and the operative capability of 
the devices and structures in exceptional conditions. The research topics include 
ageing (metallic, concrete, polymer, water chemistry, automation systems), 
non-destructive testing (NDT, metallic and concrete), structural safety analysis, 
preparation for new technologies and new material solutions.
Domestic infrastructure is vital for the maintenance and enhancement of national 
competencies. It is also useful for leveraging international experimental capabilities 
for national needs. The safety assessment of nuclear power plants requires deep 
knowledge about physical processes taking place inside the plant systems, 
structures and components. Such knowledge ultimately rests on representative 
experimentation and physical modelling. A similar understanding is also needed 
for the assessment of operational safety and plant ageing. Up-to-date research 
capabilities should satisfy the needs of both existing and future power plants and 
other nuclear facilities. The strong infrastructure development phase in the SAFIR 
programmes started with the development of VTT research capabilities realising 
the VTT Centre for Nuclear Safety. The next phase is to continue the development of 
thermal hydraulic facilities at Lappeenranta University of Technology (LUT).
A 17-person planning group appointed by the MEAE and several other experts 
have actively participated in the preparation of the Framework Plan. The planning 
group included members from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment 
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(MEAE), the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Fennovoima Oy, 
Fortum, Teollisuuden Voima Oyj (TVO), Aalto University, Lappeenranta University 
of Technology (LUT), and Technical Research Centre of Finland Ltd (VTT). The 
organisations participating in the planning represent the end users of the results 
and research organisations.
The Framework Plan presents the research topics that the planning group 
considered important in June 2018. In addition to four-year-project proposals, 
one- or two-year proposals are also expected. As already in SAFIR2018, there will 
be so-called small study projects on research topics not included in the approved 
proposals. The volume reserved for the small study projects ordered annually by 
the Management Board will be increased and the amount of one- and two-year 
projects is expected to increase. The goal is to help start new projects on new topics 
during the programme period.
99
NATIONAL NUCLEAR POWER PLANT SAFETY RESEARCH 2019–2022 
SAFIR2022 FRAMEWORK PLAN
REFERENCES
1. National Nuclear Power Plant Safety Research 2015–2018. SAFIR2018 Framework Plan. 
Publications of the Ministry of Employment and the Economy, Energy and the climate 34/2014  
(In Finnish, an English version is available at http://safir2018.vtt.fi/)
2. Hämäläinen, J. & Suolanen, V. (eds.) SAFIR2018 – The Finnish Research Programme on Nuclear 
Power Plant Safety 2015–2018. Interim Report. VTT, Espoo, 2017. VTT Technology 294. 387 p. ISBN 
978-951-38-8524-3. http://safir2018.vtt.fi/
3. SAFIR2018 Evaluation Report. The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE), Nuclear 
Waste Management Fund (VYR), MEAE guidelines and other publications 5/2018 http://urn.fi/
URN:ISBN:978-952-327-325-2
4. Report of the Committee for Nuclear Energy Competence in Finland. Publications of the Ministry 
of Employment and the Economy, Energy and Climate 2/2012 
5. Research Strategy for the Nuclear Power Sector. Publications of the Ministry of Employment and 
the Economy, Energy and Climate 17/2014 
6. SAFIR2022 programme preparation project ADMIRE2022, decision with record number SAFIR 
37/2018. Nuclear Waste Management Fund (VYR) (In Finnish)
7. National Nuclear Power Plant Safety Research Programme SAFIR2022 in 2019–2011, establishing 
the planning group, letter with record number TEM/2118/08.09.01./2017. The Ministry of 
Economic Affairs and Employment (In Finnish)
100
PUBLICATIONS OF THE MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC AFFAIRS AND EMPLOYMENT 22/2018
Appendix 1: SAFIR2022 Nuclear Safety 
Assessment Capability Model
Area Elements Note
Human resources OTR competences
nuclear specific area, no bottle necks, redundancy
nuclear related areas, all important areas covered, 
competitive partnerships
assessment and indicators for 
each year in connection to funding 
decisions
Tools appropriate coverage of validated tools
agreements on use of international tools
excellence/very good /good 
list of tools
goal/status
Laboratories VTT CNS
LUT
JHR
international cooperation
active jointly funded research projects in nuclear 
safety research infrastructure network
research project, capacity in use 
and experiments
international co-operation; 
projects and experiments
volumes
Career development and 
training 
degrees, interface with PhD program
trainees 
recruitment by stakeholders’ organizations personnel 
(review every second year)
indicators
assessment; 
Networking active participation in international research projects
attractiveness: experts and students
jointly founded projects: number and volume
external funding
presentations at conferences
indicators
Knowledge management 
and assets
data assets
deliverables: publications
….
…….
list of assets
indicators
R€=deliverable/ funding 
Research general funding
publications
impact assessment
research improvement (quality, perform research 
program, improvement)
IP assets etc.
indicators
assessment
indicators/
description
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Overall assessment of research: RG/SG/or the whole SAFIR2022 programme. 
Grade Description
Excellent Extremely strong performance at the level of international leadership. Groundbreaking research with 
transformative impact on the field. Essentially no weaknesses.
Very good Very strong performance and innovative research at an exceptionally high international level. 
Significant impact on the field. Some negligible or minor weaknesses.
Good Strong research at the level of national leadership. Several minor weaknesses.
Fair Overall performance at a nationally competitive level with solid potential for impact on the field. Several 
minor and at least one moderate weakness.
Poor Unsatisfactory overall performance. At least one major or two moderate weaknesses.
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The public nuclear safety research programmes provide the necessary conditions for 
maintaining the knowledge needed for ensuring the continuance of safe and economical use 
of nuclear power, for the development of new know-how and for participation in international 
cooperation. The Finnish organisations engaged in research in this sector have been an 
important resource that the various ministries, the Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK) and the power companies have had at their disposal. 
      The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment (MEAE) appointed in November 2017 
a group to write the Framework Plan for the new programme. This report contains a proposal 
for the general outline of the programme, entitled SAFIR2022 (SAfety of Nuclear Power 
Plants – FInnish National Research Programme). The plan has been prepared for the period 
2019–2022, but it is based on safety challenges identified for a longer time span as well. The 
research programme is strongly based on Chapter 7a of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act. 
      The construction and planning of new power plant units have increased the need for 
experts. At the same time, the retirement of existing experts has taken place and retirements 
are continuing. Active long-term research still plays a key role in the education and training of 
new experts. 
      The Framework Plan aims to define the important research needs related to safety 
challenges. The programme also aims to maintain and increase know-how in those areas 
where no significant changes occur but in which research activities are the precondition for 
the safe use of nuclear power.
